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Discussions of sexual misconduct often focus primarily or exclusively 
on the parties directly involved in sexual behavior. As a result, the 
discussion generally centers on consent. While consent is critically 
important, this Article instead focuses on harms to third parties resulting 
from sexual behavior—regardless of whether that behavior is consensual. 
Doing so reveals a dynamic that the conversation about sexual misconduct 
has not yet fully acknowledged: the presence or absence of consent between 
participants does not determine whether third parties suffer harm. Sexual 
behavior does not occur in a vacuum. Rather, it occurs in a particular context 
and often has significant consequences for other individuals beyond the 
participants in the behavior.  
Sexual behavior is problematic when it involves what this Article will 
refer to as an institutional power disparity: that is, one participant has power 
over the other as a result of their institutional roles. Institutional power 
disparities are inherent, for example, in sexual behavior involving a 
supervisor and their subordinate or a professor and their student. 
Such behavior risks significant harm to third parties within the 
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institution. Third parties may be injured as a result of sexual favoritism. For 
example, a worker may be passed over for a promotion in favor of a less 
qualified worker who is having sex with the boss. Or third parties may suffer 
harm from a sexualized institutional environment. For example, students 
may avoid professors who are known for pursuing sexual relationships with 
students or may find it alienating to be viewed as a professor’s prospective 
sexual partner. And the institution itself may suffer harm when sexual 
behavior involving an institutional power disparity interferes with worker 
productivity and morale, or with student learning and intellectual growth. 
Harm to third parties justifies regulation of sexual relationships in the 
context of an institutional power disparity. In some circumstances, such 
relationships should be prohibited so long as the institutional power 
disparity remains. In other circumstances, careful regulation can mitigate 
potential harms to third parties and to the institution itself. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One night in Cannes, the actress Daryl Hannah began receiving incessant 
phone calls to her hotel room from producer Harvey Weinstein.1 When she 
ignored the ringing phone, Weinstein came to her room and pounded 
furiously on the door. Terrified that he would sexually assault her, Hannah 
left through a side door and hid in her makeup artist’s room. She recalls: 
“We actually pushed a dresser in front of the door and just kind of huddled 
in the room.”2 
Hannah was not Weinstein’s only target: he sexually assaulted, abused, 
and harassed women for decades.3 A female executive at Weinstein’s 
company explained that he used female assistants as “honeypots” 
throughout his long history of abusing women. A female assistant “would 
initially join a meeting along with a woman Weinstein was interested in, but 
then Weinstein would dismiss them, leaving him alone with the woman.”4 
Many of these female assistants felt trapped and unable to intervene in 
behavior they found disturbing because they were afraid that they would be 
unable to work in the industry or that the restrictive nondisclosure 
agreements they had signed would be enforced against them.5 
Eugenia,6 a sales associate, began having sex with her boss, Alex, with 
“[t]he ultimate aim [of] [g]etting him to recommend me for a promotion at 
the end of my first year.”7 Eugenia was successful: she convinced Alex to 
                                                 
1. Karla Rodriguez, Annabella Sciorra and Daryl Hannah Detail Harrowing Encounters with 
Harvey Weinstein, US WEEKLY (Oct. 28, 2017), https://www.usmagazine.com/celebrity-news/news/ann 
abella-sciorra-daryl-hannah-say-harvey-weinstein-assaulted-them/ [https://perma.cc/J8YH-YN58]. 
2. Id. 
3. See, e.g., Jodi Kantor & Rachel Abrams, Gwyneth Paltrow, Angelina Jolie and Others Say 
Weinstein Harassed Them, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/10/us/gwy 
neth-paltrow-angelina-jolie-harvey-weinstein.html [https://perma.cc/EN2Z-7TBP]. 
4. Ronan Farrow, From Aggressive Overtures to Sexual Assault: Harvey Weinstein’s Accusers 




6. The names are pseudonyms, and Eugenia’s story, while written in the first person, was 
actually told to a journalist. Melissa Wong, True Story: “I Schemed My Way Into Having Sex With My 
















write her a glowing review and ultimately received the promotion. 
According to Eugenia, she deserved it. Alex “said he’d always believed that 
I was the best one on his team, anyway, and I knew he wasn’t just saying 
that because he liked me.”8 Curiously absent from her account, however, 
are Eugenia’s coworkers, who she mentions only as an obstacle to be 
negotiated: “We agreed to keep our budding relationship under wraps 
because we didn’t want others in the company to find out, so we stopped 
lunching together and he stopped giving me rides home after work.”9 
Boni Mata, a student at the University of California at Berkeley, had a 
sexual relationship with a professor while she was a student in his class.10 
In her weekly sex column for the campus newspaper, she describes their 
encounters as fulfilling and erotic.11 On one occasion, “we both looked out 
onto the street at the unfortunate passers-by who weren’t lovers like us.”12 
Grading, to her, was almost an afterthought: “Yes, he was in charge of my 
grades, but we both knew I’d have gotten an A regardless.”13 Although Mata 
does not mention her Berkeley classmates in her retelling, the comments 
following the online version of the article suggest that many were less than 
confident in Mata’s assessment of her academic abilities and less than 
enthusiastic about her assessment of her sexual relationship.14 
Daryl Hannah’s makeup artist, Harvey Weinstein’s female assistants, 
Eugenia’s coworkers, and Boni Mata’s classmates are shadowy, anonymous 
figures. They are minor characters in accounts of sexual abuse or adventure 
woven by the participants. Indeed, from reading many accounts of sexual 
behavior, both consensual and non-consensual, one might think that the 
two15 people involved in a particular instance of sexual behavior are the only 
                                                 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Boni Mata, So, I Slept With My Professor, DAILY CALIFORNIAN: SEX ON TUESDAY (Dec. 2, 




14. One comment on the online article, upvoted over two hundred times, reads: “The only thing 
that is unfortunate is that you don’t care about how other students feel about the favoritism obviously 
given to you . . . . It’s disgusting and disrespectful to other students who want to be appreciated for their 
work as well.” Go Bears, Comment to So, I Slept With My Professor, DAILY CALIFORNIAN: SEX ON 
TUESDAY (Dec. 2, 2014, 4:39 PM), http://www.dailycal.org/2014/12/02/slept-professor/ [https://perma. 
cc/8EJX-CUCN]. Another commented: “I can personally attest to the fact that I have witnessed a 
prevailing attitude among professors/instructors at UC Berkeley that often made me uncomfortable, 
where young undergraduate women were considered ‘fair game’ . . . because that one girl slept with 
them once, and if students object to being hit on they are simply being prudes/politically correct/trying 
to squash academic freedom.” Enfantbonvivant, Comment to So, I Slept With My Professor, DAILY 
CALIFORNIAN: SEX ON TUESDAY (Dec. 4, 2014, 12:28 AM), http://www.dailycal.org/2014/12/02/slept-
professor/ [https://perma.cc/8EJX-CUCN]. 













two people in the world. But the third parties I have highlighted here are 
real people with real lives, ambitions, struggles, and emotions. The sexual 
behavior of the ostensible protagonists affects them too. 
Thus far, much of the conversation about sex that has resulted from the 
#MeToo movement has focused on consent. Certainly consent is critical to 
the discussion. Non-consensual sex is uncontroversially wrong.16 It is and 
should be criminal and is often illegal in other ways as well.17 And the 
question of whether sexual behavior18 is consensual is certainly relevant to 
assessing its harms to third parties. The harm to Daryl Hannah’s makeup 
artist is different than the harm to Eugenia’s coworkers, for instance, and 
lack of consent to the behavior in the former situation explains some of the 
difference. But consent is not a magic bullet. Whether an interaction or 
relationship is consensual does not determine whether it causes harm to 
third parties.19 
Expanding the discussion to include third parties reveals a critical 
dynamic that the #MeToo movement has not yet fully recognized. 
Acknowledging harms to third parties forces us to acknowledge that sexual 
behavior does not occur in a vacuum. Rather, it occurs in a particular context 
and therefore has significant consequences beyond the participants in the 
behavior.  
Sexual behavior, I argue, is inherently problematic when it involves what 
I will call an institutional power disparity. For purposes of this Article, an 
institution is a structured and cohesive environment such as a workplace or 
                                                 
behavior that involves two people. 
16. The debate about what does or should constitute consent is a contentious one, in which this 
Article largely does not intervene. See, e.g., Deborah Tuerkheimer, Affirmative Consent, 13 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 441, 443 (2016) (“Notwithstanding a growing awareness of non-consent as the essence of rape, 
however, the legal meaning of sexual consent remains contested.”); Janet Halley, The Move to 
Affirmative Consent, SIGNS (Nov. 10, 2015), http://signsjournal.org/currents-affirmative-consent/halley 
[https://perma.cc/PJ4D-8BSK]; Hanna Kozlowska, Opinion, Yes Means Yes: The Big Consent Debate, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2014, 6:21 AM), http://op-talk.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/10/15/yes-means-yes-the-
bigconsent-debate [https://perma.cc/8HWQ-CAT9]. 
17. For example, sexual assault in the workplace might give rise both to criminal charges and to 
an employment discrimination lawsuit under Title VII. 
18. Throughout this Article, I use the term “sexual behavior” to capture a wide range of activity, 
ranging from sexually harassing comments to sexual assault to consensual sexual relationships. My point 
is not that there is no meaningful difference between these activities. Rather, the point is that in certain 
situations the difference should not change whether these activities should take place.  
19. This does not mean I think consent is over-emphasized in our current legal and social 
discourse. I am very concerned about the possibility that a powerful faculty member or supervisor may 
exert undue influence over a student or worker over whom they have considerable authority, and that 
the resulting sexual may well be non-consensual or coercive. These serious concerns, however, are not 
the focus of this Article. For purposes of this Article, therefore, I largely bracket such concerns here, 
although as I discuss periodically throughout the article, a sexualized educational environment also 
enables a culture that tolerates sexual harassment and other forms of non-consensual sexual interaction 
initiated by faculty members and involving students. 
 











school.20 An institutional power disparity is a difference in the capacity of 
parties within an institution to affect one another’s fates or circumstances as 
a result of their respective institutional roles. So sexual behavior involves 
an institutional power disparity when one individual engages in sexual 
behavior with another, and the former has power over the latter as a result 
of the former’s institutional role. Institutional power disparities are inherent, 
for example, in relationships between a supervisor and a subordinate, or 
between a professor and their student. 
I do not claim that every instance of sexual behavior involving an 
institutional power disparity is non-consensual, although many are.21 
Rather, the point is that even if such a relationship is consensual, it is still 
problematic given its harm to third parties and to the institution within 
which it occurs. The focus on third parties circumvents many common 
arguments against regulating sexual behavior—for example, that such 
regulation is paternalistic because it assumes that people cannot make their 
own decisions,22 or that it infringes on sexual autonomy by interfering with 
consensual behavior.23 Anti-paternalism or sexual autonomy are not the 
only considerations when sexual behavior also affects third parties. 
Sexual behavior involving an institutional power disparity results in 
myriad harms to third parties.24 Within a workplace, when a supervisor 
engages in a sexual relationship with a subordinate, the subordinate’s 
colleagues often experience tangibly worse working conditions. A server at 
a restaurant may be asked to stay until closing while a counterpart who is 
having sex with the manager is allowed to leave, or a law firm associate 
may be asked to perform relatively menial tasks such as electronic discovery 
while an associate who is having sex with a partner has to opportunity to 
draft and argue a dispositive motion. Workers in all environments may 
suffer diminished opportunities for promotion when competing against a 
peer who is engaged in a sexual relationship with the person who decides 
who gets promoted. Likewise, a supervisor’s peers may struggle to treat the 
subordinate fairly while maintaining a relationship with the supervisor. If a 
law firm associate who is involved in a sexual relationship with a partner 
                                                 
20. In this Article, when I refer to a school, I mean an institution of higher education such as a 
college or university. Moreover, I focus almost exclusively on workplaces and schools because these are 
the two institutions that most people encounter in their lifetimes, although this is by no means an 
exhaustive list of institutions to which my argument applies. Other relevant institutions might include 
political entities, military divisions, recreational organizations, and cultural facilities. 
21. See infra notes 74–77 (cataloguing reported instances of professors using their power over 
students to facilitate sexual abuse). 
22. See infra text accompanying notes 247–69. 
23. See infra Section II.B.1. 













produces poor work for a different partner, that partner may hesitate to take 
corrective measures for fear of creating friction with a colleague. 
Third-party harms also result from sexual behavior in educational 
institutions.25 A professor involved in a sexual relationship with a student 
may intentionally or inadvertently favor that student in grading—a 
particularly serious problem when classes are graded on a mandatory curve, 
and one likely to undermine other students’ confidence in their grades. Or a 
professor involved in a sexual relationship with a student may devote 
professional capital to advancing the student’s career by writing 
undeservedly glowing letters of reference or calling in favors with 
colleagues—a particular problem for other students when the job market is 
poor or competition for particular jobs is fierce. Moreover, when a professor 
engages in a sexual relationship with a student, the professor alienates other 
students who, perhaps correctly, suspect there may be a price to seeking 
mentorship from the professor; or who worry, perhaps correctly, that 
information they disclose to the professor will be passed on to a classmate 
who is having sex with the professor. The professor’s colleagues also may 
suffer negative consequences. A colleague may face express or implied 
pressure to give the student favorable treatment—particularly when the 
colleague is junior or untenured—or may wonder whether giving the student 
a poor grade will negatively affect their relationship with their colleague. In 
short, faculty-student sexual relationships often negatively affect the 
students who aren’t having sex with the professor and the faculty members 
who aren’t having sex with their students. 
Institutional harms also result from sexual behavior involving 
institutional power disparities.26 Such relationships sexualize the institution 
along lines of institutional power, detracting from other institutional goals. 
When a professor has sex with a student, it sexualizes the educational 
environment, shifting it from one in which students see themselves as there 
to learn, to one in which students are forced to see themselves as part of a 
pool of their professors’ prospective sexual partners, and to guard against 
that possibility if it is unwanted to them. The same is true when a supervisor 
has sex with a subordinate. Workers should not have to wonder whether 
their prospects for advancement hinge on their willingness to have sex with 
the boss. Students should not have to view themselves as involuntary 
members of their professors’ dating pool. Such concerns affect productivity 
and morale in the workplace, and they affect learning and intellectual 
growth at school. And other institutional stakeholders lose regard for an 
institution that ignores the consequences of sexual relationships tainted by 
                                                 
25. See infra Section II.A. 
26. See infra Section II.A.4. 











institutional power disparities. 
In light of these serious harms to third parties, I argue that sexual 
behavior involving an institutional power disparity should be addressed by 
law, regulation, and institutional policy. In some instances, such 
relationships should be prohibited. In other instances, such relationships 
should be disclosed and regulated via measures designed to protect the 
interests of third parties and the integrity of the institution. 
This Article offers an account of the harms to third parties to sexual 
behavior involving institutional power disparities—that is, across 
institutional contexts and on both sides of the consent line. I draw on the 
existing vast literature on sexual assault and sexual harassment, some of 
which focuses on workplaces27 or schools.28 A few researchers have 
examined the third-party harms that result from sexual harassment.29 
Several researchers have considered the problem of “sexual favoritism” in 
the workplace,30 likely inspired by a number of cases that have addressed 
the issue.31 A few scholars have also written about regulation of consensual 
faculty-student sexual relationships, although the focus is almost 
universally on the parties to the relationship, with third parties meriting at 
most a few paragraphs.32 This Article builds on prior work by demonstrating 
                                                 
27. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979); 
Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691 (1997); Vicki 
Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998); Vicki Schultz, The 
Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061 (2003); David S. Schwartz, When Is Sex Because of Sex? The 
Causation Problem in Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697 (2002). 
28. See, e.g., BILLIE WRIGHT DZIECH & LINDA WEINER, THE LECHEROUS PROFESSOR (2d ed. 
1990); SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES: ABUSING THE IVORY POWER (Michele A. Paludi 
eds., 2d ed. 1996); Nancy Chi Cantalupo & William C. Kidder, A Systematic Look at a Serial Problem: 
Sexual Harassment of Students by University Faculty, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 671 (2018); Ronna Greff 
Schneider, Sexual Harassment and Higher Education, 65 TEX. L. REV. 525 (1987). 
29. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, Was Sexual Harassment Law a Mistake? The Stories We Tell, 128 
YALE L.J. FORUM 152 (2018). 
30. See, e.g., Susan J. Best, Sexual Favoritism: A Cause of Action Under a Sex-Plus Theory, 30 
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 211 (2009); Mary Anne Case, A Few Words in Favor of Cultivating an Incest Taboo 
in the Workplace, 33 VT. L. REV. 551 (2009); Maureen S. Binetti, Romance in the Workplace: When 
“Love” Becomes Litigation, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 153, 154 (2007); Jennifer Bercovici, Note, 
The Workplace Romance and Sexual Favoritism: Creating a Dialogue Between Social Science and the 
Law of Sexual Harassment, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 183 (2006); Stephen Dacus, Note, Miller v. 
Department of Corrections: The Application of Title VII to Consensual, Indirect Employer Conduct, 59 
OKLA. L. REV. 833 (2006). 
31. See infra Part III.B.1. 
32. See, e.g., Paul M. Secunda, Getting to the Nexus of the Matter: A Sliding Scale Approach to 
Faculty-Student Consensual Relationship Policies in Higher Education, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 55 
(2004); Richard R. Carlson, Romantic Relationships Between Professors and Their Students: Morality, 
Ethics, and Law, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 493 (2001); Margaret H. Mack, Regulating Sexual Relationships 
Between Faculty and Students, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 79 (1999); Caroline Forell, What’s Wrong With 
Faculty-Student Sex? The Law School Context, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 47 (1997); Dan Subotnik, What’s 
Wrong With Faculty-Student Sex? Response II, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 441 (1997). As this Article goes to 













that harms to third parties are similar in many ways from one institution to 
the next and regardless of whether the sexual behavior is consensual. 
Until this point I have discussed the harms of sexual behavior in the 
context of institutional power disparities from an entirely gender-neutral 
standpoint. In some ways this is appropriate: such behavior affects other 
workers, other students, other faculty members, and institutional culture 
regardless of the genders of the parties involved in the sexual behavior. But 
the reality is that most sexual behavior in the context of an institutional 
power disparity involves a powerful man and a subordinate woman.33 This 
is so due to historical and ongoing gender inequality, which means that at 
the higher ranks of nearly every profession there are more men than women, 
and that the higher ranking participant therefore tends to be a man.34 
Correspondingly, the negative consequences for third parties also fall more 
heavily on women.35 Consider the consequences within colleges and 
universities. Women students are less likely to seek mentorship from an 
influential male professor known for soliciting relationships with students, 
meaning that men are more likely to receive the benefit of interaction with 
                                                 
articles on faculty-student consensual relationships—“has been suspended over allegations he had an 
inappropriate relationship with a student,” and the matter is still under review by the school that employs 
him. Bruce Vielmetti, Marquette Law School Professor Suspended Over Student Relationship, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Dec. 27, 2018), https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/education/2018/12/27/ 
marquette-law-professor-suspended-over-student-relationship/2409358002/ [https://perma.cc/A3JP-R 
XES;. xee also, e.g., Karen Sloan, Prominent Law Professor Pulled From Teaching Amid Sexual 
Misconduct Allegations, LAW.COM (Dec. 27, 2018, 12:56 PM), https://www.law.com/2018/12/27/promi 
nent-law-prof-pulled-from-teaching-amid-sexual-misconduct-allegations/; Natallie St. Onge, Law 
Professor Suspended for Alleged Relationship with Student, MARQUETTE WIRE (Jan. 14, 2019), https:// 
marquettewire.org/4004257/news/law-school-professor-suspended-for-alleged-relationship-with-stude 
nt/ [https://perma.cc/2Q2N-96AH].   
33. See, e.g., Myrtle P. Bell & Mary E. McLaughlin, Sexual Harassment and Women’s 
Advancement: Issues, Challenges, and Directions, in ADVANCING WOMEN’S CAREERS: RESEARCH AND 
PRACTICE 83, 89 (Ronald J. Burke & Debra L. Nelson eds., 2002) (explaining that women are more 
likely to be supervised by men, thereby “making [women] far more likely targets for quid pro quo 
harassment”). More recently, a crowdsourced survey documenting over 2400 incidents of sexual 
misconduct in academia (as of February 2018) appears to include mostly sexual behavior involving a 
more senior man and a less senior woman. The survey does not always identify the gender of the less 
senior party, so in some instances the less senior party might be a woman, a man, or a person who 
identifies as some other gender. Karen Kelsky, Sexual Harassment in the Academy: A Crowdsource 
Survey, https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1S9KShDLvU7C-KkgEevYTHXr3F6InTenrBsS9yk-8 
C5M/edit#gid=1530077352 (last retrieved Feb. 17, 2018) [hereinafter Crowdsource Survey]. See also 
Karen Kelsky, A Crowdsourced Survey of Sexual Harassment in the Academy, PROFESSOR IS IN: BLOG 
(Dec. 1, 2017), https://theprofessorisin.com/2017/12/01/a-crowdsourced-survey-of-sexual-harassment-
in-the-academy/ (explaining and offering context for the Crowdsourced Survey). 
34. Gary N. Powell, Workplace Romances Between Senior-Level Executives and Lower-Level 
Employees: An Issue of Work Disruption and Gender, 54 HUM. REL. 1519, 1526 (2001).  
35. Evidence of this burden can be found in the rise in women-oriented workspaces, whose 
growth “has been interlinked with [the #MeToo movement].” Michelle R. Smith, “My Happy Place.” 
Workspaces for Women Rise in #MeToo Era, AP NEWS (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/8d729 
d1d51094cb09f55464d09d82a9e [https://perma.cc/BN4B-7R7G]. 
 











and mentorship from that professor.36 And women bear the brunt of a 
sexualized institutional culture in which professors feel generally at liberty 
to treat students as prospective sexual partners. In the aggregate, such 
behavior helps to explain why women are disproportionately unlikely to 
pursue careers in many academic fields.37 If #MeToo has taught us anything, 
it is that the harms of sexual harassment, abuse, and assault do not fall 
equally on men and on women.38 The same is true when we expand our 
reckoning of these harms to include those to third parties.39 
My conclusions will surely strike some as overreaching, perhaps 
radically so. We prize sexual autonomy in America40; why should concerns 
about third parties ruin the fun for consenting adults? But in fact there are 
many situations in which we believe that third-party or institutional 
concerns should override individual sexual desire, at least as an ethical or 
moral matter if not as a legal one. Most of us agree that a person should not 
have sex with someone other than their spouse if they are in a monogamous 
marriage, even if both participants in the extramarital sex consent. Most of 
us agree that people shouldn’t have sex in public places, even if they both 
consent. Most of us agree that a judge shouldn’t have sex with a lawyer who 
has a case before the judge, even if they both consent. Most of us agree that 
people shouldn’t have sex with their parents or siblings, even if they both 
consent. Our views about sex under these circumstances is not dictated by 
the presence or absence of consent. Rather, we think people should refrain 
from sex in some contexts because that sex has negative consequences for 
third parties, institutions, or society as a whole.41 Here, I extend this already-
                                                 
36. See supra note 33 (noting that most of the experiences documented in the Crowdsource 
Spreadsheet involve a more junior woman and a more senior man). 
37. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Saul, Philosophy Has a Sexual Harassment Problem, SALON (Aug. 16, 
2013, 12:45 AM), https://www.salon.com/2013/08/15/philosophy_has_a_sexual_harassment_problem/ 
[https://perma.cc/N649-JELC] (discussing sexual misconduct by senior male professors as one reason 
that only seventeen percent of full-time philosophy professors are women). 
38. For example, women made eight in ten sexual harassment charges to the EEOC between 
2005 and 2015. Jocelyn Frye, Not Just the Rich and Famous, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, (Nov. 
20, 2017 4:59 PM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/news/2017/11/20/443139/not-jus 
t-rich-famous/ (compiling EEOC data). 
39. See infra Section II.A.3. As I discuss in more detail in Part IV, a serious and legitimate 
concern is that policies designed to regulate relationships involving an institutional power disparity will 
be unevenly enforced against disfavored groups, such as racial minorities and same-sex partners. The 
concern for uneven enforcement, however, does not counsel in favor of no regulation; rather, it militates 
in favor of stronger measures to ensure that regulation is evenly applied. 
40. See, e.g., Jacob Gersen & Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 881 (2016) 
(objecting to “bureaucratic” intrusion pursuant to Title IX into consensual sexual activity). 
41. In a number of other situations, there is less consensus, but many people still agree that 
consenting adults should not engage in sex due to harms to third parties, institutions, or society. For 
example, many people would agree that consenting adults should not have sex when money is 
exchanged. One poll found that nearly half of American adults concur that prostitution should be illegal. 













existing view to another context where compelling considerations involving 
third parties counsel restraint. Sexual behavior involving an institutional 
power disparity takes a real toll on third parties. And they, too, matter. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the incidence of and 
attitudes toward sexual behavior involving institutional power disparities in 
workplaces and in institutions of higher education. Part II articulates the 
ways in which sexual relationships involving institutional power disparities 
harm third parties. This account satisfies critical deficiencies in the existing 
literature on sexual relationships within institutions and the recent 
discussion of sexual misconduct prompted by the #MeToo movement. It 
also provides a rebuttal to those who counsel against any regulation of 
sexual relationships involving institutional power disparities. Part III 
considers how existing laws, regulations, and codes of conduct apply to 
such third-party harms. While existing mechanisms may be used to address 
some third-party harms, a systemic response is lacking. Part IV argues that 
in many cases sexual behavior involving institutional power disparities 
should be prohibited—even when such behavior is consensual—because of 
the serious harms it causes to third parties and institutions. In other 
circumstances, mitigating measures are sufficient to protect the interests of 
third parties and institutional interests. 
I. SEX AND INSTITUTIONS 
This Part catalogues the incidence of and attitudes toward sexual 
behavior involving an institutional power disparity. It examines two 
institutions: workplaces and schools.42 As noted in the Introduction, I 
selected these institutions because they are the ones that most people have 
contact with at some point in their lives.43 Within both workplaces and 
schools, sexual behavior involving an institutional power disparity is both 
common and often viewed as problematic. 
 
 
A. Sex at Work 
Consensual sexual relationships between supervisors and their 
subordinates are common. In a 2013 survey 54% of people said they have 
                                                 
42. As noted, throughout this Article, when I refer to a school, I mean an institution of higher 
education such as a college or university. 
43. Other institutions are likely susceptible to a similar analysis regarding sexual behavior 
involving an institutional power disparity. 
 











had sex with a colleague; moreover, 13.7% of respondents reported having 
had sex with their boss, while 35.6% of people said they have had sex with 
a subordinate.44 A 2017 survey put the overall dating figure at 41%, with 
15% saying they had dated a supervisor.45 Other research has found that 
“hierarchical” workplace sexual relationships—meaning relationships 
between workers “at different organizational levels,” are more pervasive 
than “lateral” sexual relationships—those between workers at the same 
level.46 Regardless of the precise numbers, sexual relationships between 
supervisors and subordinates occur with some regularity. 
Various non-consensual forms of sexual behavior between supervisors 
and subordinates are also common. Precise statistics on sexual harassment 
are elusive and depend on the way the problematic behavior is defined. A 
2017 New York Times survey found that a third of men “said they had done 
something at work within the past year that would qualify as objectionable 
behavior or sexual harassment.”47 Recent polls find that at least 25% of 
women, and possibly many more, have experienced sexual harassment at 
work,48 as well as 10% of men.49 The incidence of non-consensual behavior 
persists across industries. It exists in academia.50 It exists in construction.51 
Workers at restaurants such as IHOP and Applebees, among others, have 
reported widespread harassment.52 Some research has found that workers in 
                                                 
44. Henry Blodget, SEX-AT-WORK SURVEY: The Results Are In!, BUS. INSIDER (May 26, 2013, 
11:39 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/sex-at-work-survey-results-2013-5?op=1 [https://perma.c 
c/US9M-SQ67]. 
45. Sarah Sipek, Caught Up in an Office Romance, CAREER BUILDER (Feb. 9, 2017), https://ww 
w.careerbuilder.com/advice/caught-up-in-an-office-romance [https://perma.cc/8MPV-K58B]. 
46. Bercovici, supra note 30, at 200–01; see also Powell, supra note 33, at 1520. 
47. Jugal K. Patel et al., We Asked 615 Men About How They Conduct Themselves at Work, N.Y. 
TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/28/upshot/sexual-
harassment-survey-600-men.html [https://perma.cc/C3CC-KHSD]. 
48. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, REPORT OF THE CO-CHAIRS OF THE EEOC 
SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE, at 8 (June 2016), https://ww 
w.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_force/harassment/upload/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XL9-4X45] (estimating 
that anywhere “from 25% to 85% of women report having experienced sexual harassment in the 
workplace”); ABC News/Washington Post Poll, Unwanted Sexual Advances: Not Just a Hollywood 
Story (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.langerresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/1192a1SexualHarassment. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/DLY4-2NHK] (54% of women report experiencing unwanted sexual advances); 
Gary Langer, One in Four U.S. Women Reports Workplace Harassment, ABC NEWS/WASHINGTON 
POST POLL (Nov. 16, 2011), www.langerresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/1130a2WorkplaceHarassme 
nt.pdf [https://perma.cc/RJ26-CRRH] (25% of women report workplace harassment). 
49. Langer, supra note 48 (finding that 10% of men experienced sexual harassment). 
50. See, e.g., Reshma Jagsi et al., Sexual Harassment and Discrimination Experiences of 
Academic Medical Faculty, 315 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2120, 2120–21 (2016) (almost one-third of medical 
academic faculty responding to survey had experienced workplace sexual harassment). 
51. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., WOMEN IN CONSTRUCTION: STILL BREAKING GROUND 2, 8 
(2014) (finding that, while women are only 2.6% of construction workers, 88% of them report 
experiencing harassment). 













the gig economy—a platform-based sector including major companies such 
as Uber, Lyft, Handy, Grubhub, and Postmates—are especially vulnerable 
to sexual harassment.53 While not every instance of sexual harassment 
involves a supervisor and a subordinate, the power differential between the 
two enables harassing behavior.  
Sexual behavior between supervisors and subordinates has a consistent 
place in culture. Many such incidents are treated as a humorous plot twist, 
with little consideration of their effects on other workers. Consider, for 
example, The Office, in which Michael and his supervisor Jan begin dating, 
with the ensuing awkward workplace situations serving as a source of 
comedy.54 In Secretary, the power dynamic between the male boss and his 
female assistant is integral to their unusual sexual relationship; no one stops 
to wonder what it might be like for the paralegal in the small law office, 
who in one scene is in the next stall as the secretary is masturbating loudly 
in the bathroom.55 And in The Proposal, a female boss at a publishing house 
forces her male assistant to marry her so that she can retain her immigration 
status, in exchange for which she promises to promote him to an editor 
position and to publish a book that he supports—with no mention of the 
people who are not getting promoted to editor or the books that are not 
getting published.56 In short, sexual behavior involving a workplace power 
disparity is, more often than not, treated as the stuff of romantic comedy, 
with literally no attention to the harms that third parties to the relationship 
suffer. 
Less frequently, sexual relationships between supervisors and 
subordinates are treated as problematic. Sometimes the concern is framed 
as one of sexual harassment: the problem is a relatively simple one of 
consent.57 Relatedly, the concern is sometimes treated as one of liability for 
the company.58 Only rarely does a movie show negative consequences for 
the third parties in the workplace relating to sexual behavior between a 
                                                 
Complaints Against IHOP, Applebee’s Restaurants, VOX (Feb. 7, 2018, 9:30 AM), https://www.vox.co 
m/policy-and-politics/2018/2/7/16739424/sexual-harassment-complaints-restaurant-ihop-applebees [ht 
tps://perma.cc/Y2AW-F7J2]. 
53. Nathan Heller, The Gig Economy Is Especially Susceptible to Sexual Harassment, NEW 
YORKER, Jan. 25, 2018, https://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/the-gig-economy-is-esp 
ecially-susceptible-to-sexual-harassment [https://perma.cc/39CG-BMGH]. 
54. The Office: Season 3 (NBC 2007); The Office: Season 4 (NBC 2008). 
55. SECRETARY (Lions Gate Films 2002). 
56. THE PROPOSAL (Touchstone Pictures 2009). 
57. See, e.g., HORRIBLE BOSSES (New Line Cinema 2011) (a dental assistant experiences loss of 
morale and fear for his relationship with his fiancée after his boss sexually harasses him). 
58. See, e.g., MICHAEL CRICHTON, DISCLOSURE (1994) (sexual harassment accusations within 
the workplace jeopardize a merger). 
 











supervisor and subordinate.59 
The lighthearted attitude in popular culture toward sexual behavior 
involving a supervisor and a subordinate does not reflect actual beliefs. 
Surveys reveal that a significant number of people distinguish between 
workplace sexual relationships with peers versus with supervisors or 
subordinates. In one study, 84% of respondents believe they should be 
allowed to have sex with colleagues, and 52% said sex with colleagues is 
fine if handled professionally and does not involve a direct reporting 
relationship.60 But attitudes changed substantially when it came to bosses: 
64% of people believe that sex between supervisors and subordinates should 
be prohibited outright.61 Along similar lines, a 2012 survey found that 64% 
of people believe that a supervisor should be fired for having sex with a 
subordinate.62 
Discussion of workplace romances often prompt an odd fatalism. One 
commentator refers to “the fact that workplace romances clearly will exist, 
regardless of the rules and regulations that may be put in place to discourage 
them.”63 We might ask why workplace sexual behavior is a foregone 
conclusion. We expect people to follow other office regulations, such as 
maintaining confidentiality and refraining from stealing office supplies. 
What is different about refraining from having sex with coworkers, or, more 
accurately for present purposes, refraining from having sex with the 
relatively small subset of one’s coworkers who are either bosses or 
subordinates? Certainly cultivating an air of inevitability around such 
behavior will not make it less common. 
B. Sex at School 
Like relationships between supervisors and subordinates, faculty-student 
sexual relationships are common. In a survey conducted in 2005 in the 
United Kingdom, 18% of academics reported having had a sexual 
relationship with a student.64 Of these, 21% said this violated their 
                                                 
59. See, e.g., SHOWGIRLS (Carolco Pictures 1995) (other strippers call out their colleague for 
giving the stage manager a lap dance). 
60. Blodget, supra note 44. 
61. Id. 
62. Rieva Lesonsky, Sex at Work Less Likely to Get You Fired Than Taking Company 
Information: Survey Says, HUFFINGTON POST, (Apr. 2, 2012, 1:10 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/ 
entry/sex-at-work-less-likely-to-get-you-fired_n_1395459 [https://perma.cc/X2PL-T4NE]. 
63. Binetti, supra note 30, at 154. 
64. See Hannah Fearn, Sex and the University, TIMES HIGHER EDUCATION (May 22, 2008), http 
s://www.timeshighereducation.com/features/sex-and-the-university/401935.article. The survey notes 
that “American universities are much stricter in their institutional policies on sexual or romantic 













institution’s policy, 26% said it did not, 41% said they did not know, and 
12% said there was no policy.65 Sexual harassment is also common. An 
extensive survey administered by the Association of American Universities 
(AAU) and Westat at twenty-seven elite public and private research 
universities found that 44.1% of female graduate students and 29.6% of 
male graduate students reported sexual harassment.66 Of the female 
graduate students, 22.4% reported that they were harassed by a faculty 
member.67 
Like supervisor-subordinate relationships, sexual relationships between 
faculty and students are normalized in popular culture.68 In literature, 
Bernard Malamud’s A New Life,69 Malcolm Bradbury’s The History Man,70 
Philip Roth’s The Ghost Writer,71 J.M. Coetzee’s Disgrace,72 and Michael 
Chabon’s Wonder Boys73 portray professors who have sexual relationships 
with students.74 David Mamet’s play Oleanna presents a sexualized 
interaction between a professor and his female student.75 An episode of the 
iconic and much-loved television series Friends is literally titled “The One 
Where Ross Dates A Student.”76 And these examples hardly exhaust the 
genre.77 Moreover, in the world of literature and film, such relationships are 
nearly always presented as involving a sexually available young woman 
                                                 
this might affect the data: perhaps UK faculty are more likely to engage in sexual relationships; perhaps 
they are simply more likely to admit to them in a survey. In any event, as the other data presented 
throughout this Article demonstrate, the percentage of US faculty members who have engaged in a 
sexual relationship with a student is certainly nowhere near zero. 
65. Id. 
66. DAVID CANTOR ET AL., REPORT ON THE AAU CAMPUS CLIMATE SURVEY ON SEXUAL 
ASSAULT AND SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 29 (Sept. 21, 2015), https://www.aau.edu/sites/default/files/%40 
%20Files/Climate%20Survey/AAU_Campus_Climate_Survey_12_14_15.pdf. While this Article 
focuses primarily on the harms of sexual harassment of women, the survey also found that transgender, 
genderqueer, non-conforming, and gender questioning graduate students were the most likely to report 
harassment. Id. 
67. Id. at 31. 
68. The notion of an older and more worldly teacher educating a young disciple dates to Aristotle. 
PLATO’S SYMPOSIUM: A TRANSLATION BY SETH BENARDETE (2001). The beloved musical and later 
film, My Fair Lady, in which Henry Higgins educates Eliza Doolittle to meet his specifications, is a 
more modern example of this genre. MY FAIR LADY (Lerner & Leowe 1956) (musical); MY FAIR LADY 
(Warner Bros 1964) (film). 
69. BERNARD MALAMUD, A NEW LIFE (1961). 
70. MALCOLM BRADBURY, THE HISTORY MAN (1975). 
71. PHILIP ROTH, THE GHOST WRITER (1979). 
72. J.M. COETZEE, DISGRACE (1999). 
73. MICHAEL CHABON, WONDER BOYS (1995). 
74. Tim O’Brien’s Tomcat in Love presents a somewhat more self-aware version—for instance, 
when the protagonist’s female student correctly observes, after he touches her stomach, “I’m not an 
adult.” TIM O’BRIEN, TOMCAT IN LOVE 93 (1998). 
75. DAVID MAMET, OLEANNA (1993). 
76. Friends: The One Where Ross Dates A Student, FRIENDS (NBC television broadcast Mar. 9, 
2000). 
77. See also, e.g., SUSAN CHOI, MY EDUCATION (2014); JESSICA LOTT, THE REST OF US (2014). 
 











student and an older male faculty member to whom she is supposedly 
attracted, however inexplicably.78 Indeed, the faculty-student relationship is 
a subgenre of film and literature in which the notion of men engaged in 
sexual relationships with much younger women is presented as completely 
normal and unproblematic.79 
Out in the real world, faculty-student relationships have been largely 
tolerated for decades. Consider the following quote from William Kerrigan, 
then a professor at Amherst: 
I have been the subject of advances from male and female students 
for twenty-five years. . . . And there is a particular kind of student I 
have responded to. . . . [T]here is a kind of student I’ve come across 
in my career who was working through something that only a 
professor could help her with. I’m talking about a female student 
who, for one reason or another, has unnaturally prolonged her 
virginity. . . .  
There have been times when this virginity has been presented to me 
as something that I, not quite another man, half an authority figure, 
can handle—a thing whose preciousness I realize. . . . And then things 
come down to earth, and there often follows disappointment and, on 
the part of the student, anger. But still, these relationships exist 
between adults and can be quite beautiful and genuinely 
transforming.80 
Some faculty members criticized the sentiments and behavior reflected in 
Kerrigan’s comments,81 but given the percentage of faculty members—
mostly men—who have had sex with their students, his views are best 
regarded as an extreme on a continuum, not as a shocking outlier. And while 
sexual relationships between male professors and female students are more 
common,82 they are not the only gender permutation. For example, feminist 
scholar Jane Gallop has defended her sexual involvement with female 
                                                 
78. See, e.g., THE SQUID AND THE WHALE (Samuel Goldwyn Films 2005). 
79. See, e.g., MANHATTAN (United Artists 1979) (depicting Woody Allen’s forty-two-year-old 
character dating a seventeen-year-old girl played by Mariel Hemingway). For a discussion of the ways 
in which fiction sometimes bleeds into reality, see also Julie Miller, Mariel Hemingway Says Woody 
Allen Tried to Seduce Her When She Was a Teenager, VANITY FAIR, Mar. 25, 2015, https://www.vanityf 
air.com/hollywood/2015/03/woody-allen-mariel-hemingway-manhattan [https://perma.cc/9TQC-W9Y 
V]. 
80. New Rules About Sex on Campus, HARPER’S MAGAZINE, Sept. 1993, at 33, 35–36 (1993). 

















students not only as unharmful, but also as pedagogically valuable.83  
More recently, a number of incidents of allegedly non-consensual sexual 
behavior involving faculty and students have come to light. Blake 
Wentworth, a professor in the Department of South and Southeast Asian 
Studies at UC Berkeley, was terminated for sexually harassing and 
inappropriately touching several students; Wentworth’s departure was the 
latest in a series of six professors found to have violated the school’s sexual 
misconduct policies between 2011 and 2016.84 Peter Ludlow, a professor of 
philosophy, resigned from Northwestern University after investigators 
found that he had sexually harassed two students.85 Rohit Varma was 
removed as the dean of the medical school at the University of Southern 
California after the school learned of a large settlement paid to a young 
researcher over a decade earlier after Varma forced her to sleep in a hotel 
room with him.86 Other incidents, almost uniformly involving male 
professors and female students, are legion.87 
The recent #MeToo movement has also prompted an anonymous, 
crowdsourced spreadsheet listing, at last count, over 2400 instances of non-
consensual sexual behavior in academia, many involving professors and 
students.88 And a number of women have also recounted their stories in 
venues ranging from Title IX and other administrative proceedings89 to the 
popular media.90 
                                                 
83. JANE GALLOP, FEMINIST ACCUSED OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT (1997). 
84. Emily Deruy, UC Berkeley Fires Professor for Sexually Harassing Four Students, MERCURY 
NEWS, May 25, 2017, https://www.mercurynews.com/2017/05/25/uc-berkeley-professor-fired-for-sexu 
al-harassing-students/ [https://perma.cc/F9GE-BSVC]. 
85. Ciara McCarthy, Northwestern Professor Resigns After Sexual Harassment Investigation, 
THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 3, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/nov/03/northwestern-profe 
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86. Sarah Parvini et al., USC Medical School Dean Out Amid Revelations of Sexual Harasssment 
Claim, $135,000 Settlement With Researcher, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2017, http://www.latimes.com/local/l 
anow/la-me-usc-dean-harassment-20171005-story.html [https://perma.cc/L7V2-ASET]. 
87. See, e.g., Kay Lazar, Berklee President: 11 Faculty Members Have Been Terminated in 13 
Years for Sex Assault, Harassment, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 13, 2017, https://www.bostonglobe.com/met 
ro/2017/11/13/berklee-school-music-president-hold-meeting-monday-sex-harassment-campus/wXBMr 
QVkSz968DA3OixqMP/story.html [https://perma.cc/MY3T-TADR] (“Berklee’s student body and 
faculty is overwhelmingly male, a factor several faculty members said strongly contributes to a sexually 
abusive culture on campus.”); Mona Gable, The Hugo Problem, LA MAGAZINE, Mar. 26, 2014, http://w 
ww.lamag.com/longform/the-hugo-problem/ [https://perma.cc/QPL5-J5RY] (describing Hugo 
Schwyzer’s highly publicized transgressions, including sexual relationships with numerous students). 
88. Crowdsource Survey, supra note 33. 
89. See, e.g., Julie Wurth, Accusers: Sanctions Against UI Law Professor Fall Short, NEWS-
GAZETTE, Oct. 19, 2018, http://www.news-gazette.com/news/local/2018-10-19/accusers-sanctions-agai 
nst-ui-law-professor-fall-short.html [https://perma.cc/K3HH-Z8BG]; Nell Gluckman, What Went 
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[https://perma.cc/9B UW-7ADF]. 
90. See, e.g., Seo-Young Chu, Woven: A Refuge for Jae-In Doe: Fugues in the Key of English 
 











Despite these recent concerns, in our current culture, faculty-student 
sexual relationships are often regarded as something that just happens, with 
all the inevitability of the weather.91 Just a few years ago, an Above the Law 
story stated: “Student-professor relationships are typically frowned upon in 
academia, but sometimes it’s completely unavoidable.”92 Likewise, the 
now-defunct media outlet Gawker responded to Harvard’s ban on sexual 
relationships between faculty and students by inviting readers to share 
stories about sleeping with their professors, or sleeping with their students.93 
The resulting “top ten” list is treated as a humorous excavation of a minor 
transgression, perhaps akin to underage drinking—not as a serious problem 
potentially affecting the well-being of students on campuses nationwide.94  
And many university administrators agree: as one high-ranking university 
official puts it, “The availability of partners is a geographical matter; if you 
are cooped up on a campus, who are you likely to fall into bed with?”95 Yet 
similar to supervisor-supervisee relationships, , we should question why 
many people view faculty-student relationships as inevitable.96 
II. THIRD-PARTY HARMS 
This Part examines the harms to third parties resulting from sexual 
behavior involving an institutional power disparity. Section II.A provides a 
detailed account of injuries to third parties and institutions that result from 
sexual behavior involving an institutional power disparity. The list is not 
meant to be exhaustive. Nor are the categories neatly divided; they overlap 
in ways that are sometimes untidy. Rather, the goal is to show that sexual 
behavior involving an institutional power disparity causes a wide range of 
significant harms to third parties and institutions themselves. 
In Section II.B, the Article refutes three common objections to regulating 
sexual behavior involving an institutional power disparity. The first 
                                                 
Major, ENTROPY (Nov. 3, 2017), https://entropymag.org/a-refuge-for-jae-in-doe-fugues-in-the-key-of-
english-major/ [https://perma.cc/N7NR-6WY9] (describing rape and other sexual abuses by Jay 
Fliegelman, a then-revered English Professor at Stanford University). 
91. See, e.g., Mack, supra note 32, at 80 (1999) (“Some universities impose bans in the hopes 
that sanctions will deter sexual advances. But . . . these bans will not eliminate faculty-student sex, and 
sexual advances will continue to be a problem for some students.”). 
92. Staci Zaretsky, Law Student Regales Us With Tales of Dirty Sex With Her Professor, ABOVE 
THE LAW (Feb. 17, 2015, 12:04 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2015/02/law-student-regales-us-with-tale 
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sy-of-1686111091 [https://perma.cc/RJ7W-ZTZX]. 
94. Id. 
95. Fearn, supra note 64. 
96. Id. (quoting one student: “There will always be inter-office relationships—sleeping your way 












objection is that such relationships are empowering to the individual and 
beneficial to the institutional environment. The second objection is that 
desexualizing institutions is undesirable. The third objection is that we 
should not regulate sexual behavior between consenting adults. These 
objections may carry weight with respect to some types of sexual behavior: 
for example, sexual relationships between classmates or employees of the 
same rank. But these critiques also do not examine sufficiently the harm to 
third parties that arises from sexual behavior involving an institutional 
power disparity, and as a result are unconvincing with respect to that subset 
of sexual behavior.  
A. Injuries to Third Parties and Institutions 
Sexual relationships in the context of an institutional power disparity 
cause serious harm to third parties and institutions. Some harms are 
material: they consist of the loss of a benefit or of an actual detriment. Other 
harms are affective: they consist of decreased enjoyment or satisfaction in 
some way relating to the institution. In the aggregate, these harms 
disproportionately affect women, reinforcing existing gender inequalities. 
And finally, the institution itself also suffers harm, including economic 
losses, reputational injury, and less effective implementation of its 
mission.97 
 
1. Material losses 
In 1990, Charlotte Perry was a long-time employee of the state of 
Arkansas.98 She applied for a job as an administrative assistant at the 
Arkansas Board of Review for which, by all accounts, she was well-
qualified.99 A woman named Gennifer Flowers applied for the same position 
                                                 
97. As commentators have rightly observed, many of these harms are not unique to sexual 
relationships and might occur in situations involving any close relationship—a friendship, a parent-child 
relationship—that crosses lines of institutional power. See, e.g., Case, supra note 30, at 555 (“If . . . you 
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your hiring decisions could well be found to violate Title VII.”); Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 
supra note 27, at 2189 (noting that “supervisors may also develop nonsexual attachments that predispose 
them to favor particular employees”). My position, which is similar to that expressed by Case in her 
short essay is that a so-called “incest taboo”—regulating both sexual and non-sexual workplace 
relationships that cause harm to third parties—would be a good thing. This Article focuses on sexual 
relationships, but I hope that future work will examine favoritism flowing from other personal 
relationships. In general, I favor regulation of both. 















and was originally ranked ninth out of eleven applicants. Ultimately, 
however, Flowers received the job. Events surrounding the incident suggest 
that the description of the position was rewritten to match Flowers’s 
qualifications because she was involved in a sexual relationship with then-
Governor of Arkansas Bill Clinton. Perry filed a complaint, but ultimately 
she never received any remedy for the unfair treatment she suffered.100 
If the facts alleged are true, Perry’s injury was the result of sexual 
favoritism, meaning that she suffered because a superior preferred their 
sexual partner. Sexual favoritism often results from sexual relationships 
involving an institutional power disparity and harms both workers and 
students. Courts and commentators attest to these harms. In Broderick v. 
Ruder, for example, the court stated that the sexual favoritism that led to the 
dispute “undermined plaintiff’s motivation and work performance and 
deprived plaintiff, and other . . . female employees, of promotions and job 
opportunities.”101 As a commentator in academia put it: “For me, it was an 
equity issue. It was simply unfair to other students that one student in a close 
personal relationship with a professor should have her/his work graded by 
that professor. . . . I think most people accepted that perspective.”102 Another 
agreed that “a liaison between an instructor and one of the students in his or 
her class constitutes an unfairness—not least to the other students, who can’t 
hope to receive due attention when competing with a paramour.”103 
Sometimes the harm resulting from sexual favoritism is readily 
quantifiable. Consider, for example, a law student enrolled in a class taught 
by an influential professor who is involved in a sexual relationship with a 
student in the class—we’ll call her Jennifer.104 The class is relatively 
small—only twenty-five students—and is graded on a strict curve: both the 
median and the mean must be a 3.0, or a B. As is the case in many law 
school classes, exams are graded blindly, but as is also the case in many law 
classes, grades may include points for participation. The professor awards 
Jennifer the highest participation grade in the class, which ultimately boosts 
her overall grade to an A—the highest grade in the class. As a result, every 
other student moves down the curve. One student receives a B plus instead 
of an A minus. As a result, that student misses the top ten percent of her 
class by a tenth of a point and does not graduate as a member of the Order 
of the Coif, the law school honors society. 
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In other instances, the harm is qualitative. Consider, for example, the law 
students who compete with Jennifer for a competitive judicial clerkship 
following graduation. The influential professor who is involved in a sexual 
relationship with Jennifer seeks out several colleagues on the faculty and 
strongly encourages them to write letters of recommendation for her. Then 
the professor calls the judge—a former colleague at the firm where he 
practiced prior to academia—and tells her that Jennifer is the best student 
he has ever had. Although Jennifer has lower grades than many other 
applicants for the position, the judge ends up hiring her. Although we cannot 
say with certainty that any of the other students would have received the 
clerkship had Jennifer not been engaged in a sexual relationship with the 
professor, the professor’s involvement likely influenced the outcome and 
certainly affected the perceptions of the other students involved. 
Relatedly, consider the colleagues the professor seeks out to write letters 
for Jennifer. Suppose that one of them is not tenured. Even if the faculty 
member thinks Jennifer is a mediocre student, she may be concerned that 
denying a senior colleague a request could have a negative effect on her 
tenure application. Commentators have noted the conflict inherent in 
grading a professor’s “significant other” for the professor’s colleagues105—
particularly if the colleague charged with grading the significant other is 
junior or untenured. 
Such harms are concrete. A student who loses out on a grade or a 
prestigious clerkship loses material career benefits, while a professor who 
is compelled to write a letter of recommendation to preserve her own 
professional well-being loses the opportunity to advance the candidacy of a 
student of her own. These are tangible losses, not “mere” feelings, and as 
this example demonstrates, they affect any number of third parties to sexual 
relationships involving an institutional power disparity. 
 
 
2. Affective losses 
In light of these tangible harms described in the previous section, it is 
unsurprising that sexual favoritism also has a negative psychological effect 
on third parties within the institution. As one commentator explains, “the 
effect on the morale of other employees (both male and female) of seeing a 
co-employee get ahead in his or her job by virtue of having sex with the 
boss defeats the meritocracy that purportedly exists in this country.”106 
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Third parties to sexual relationships understandably experience anger, 
frustration, alienation, and a general loss of enthusiasm for the institution.  
Social science evidence reinforces the idea that a sexual relationship 
involving an institutional power disparity is disruptive because it changes 
the nature of the interaction that takes place between people in institutional 
environments.107 In a normal workplace, interactions take place in what Lisa 
Mainiero calls the “Task” and “Career” domains: workers put forward their 
efforts in exchange for pay and career advancement.108 One can easily draw 
an analogy to the higher education setting, where students put forth effort in 
exchange for grades and, ultimately, a degree. 
But when individuals engage in a sexual relationship in the context of an 
institutional power disparity, it introduces the “Personal” or “Sexual” 
domains into the equation.109 The presence of sexual relationships 
communicates to other workers or students that their position in the 
institution will be affected by their unwillingness or inability to engage in 
the institution along those domains.110 As a result, the sexual relationship 
causes disruption of normal institutional functioning.111 
Quantitative research and anecdotal evidence reinforces that this concern 
sometimes becomes a reality. Sexual relationships or other sexual behavior 
that implicate an institutional power dynamic often create a tense 
environment for third parties. In a 2013 survey of 312 companies, 30% 
expressed concern for the “lowered morale of co-workers of those involved 
in the romance.”112 One executive attests to “all the rumor and innuendo” 
that goes on around a sexual relationship at work.113 After having seen 
several sexual relationships among his employees, he explains, “There 
would be days when a couple weren’t talking to each other, and you could 
feel the negative energy. You get pulled in.”114 Another executive states that 
a sexual relationship in the office “is always disruptive.”115 While this could 
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be true for any intra-office relationship, a supervisor-subordinate sexual 
relationship that is going badly can be more uncomfortable for third parties 
because of the power dynamics involved.  
Indeed, sexual behavior need not rise to the level of a relationship to 
create a conflicted work environment. After an incident in which former 
Judge Alex Kozinski repeatedly told Emily Murphy, a clerk for Judge 
Richard Paez, that she should exercise naked, the clerk reported the incident 
to Judge Paez, Kozinski’s Ninth Circuit colleague.116 Judge Paez was 
supportive of her reporting the behavior, but since Judge Kozinski—as the 
chief judge of the circuit—would have been the person to whom the 
behavior would have been reported, Murphy did not report him.117 Without 
a doubt the primary harm in this instance is to Murphy, but one can imagine 
that the incident also created a troubling dilemma for Judge Paez.118 Indeed, 
the incidence of such dilemmas for third parties seems to have been a 
hallmark of Judge Kozinski’s behavior over the years. Dahlia Lithwick 
reported a similar incident—in which Kozinski called her and asked her 
what she was wearing—to the judge for whom she clerked on the Ninth 
Circuit, who “looked horrified” but did nothing.119 Lithwick explains that 
Kozinski created a world in which everyone knew what was going on, and 
everyone was complicit: whether they were victims or bystanders, “those in 
his circle got dragged along into a world that diminishes and belittles 
women.”120 As she puts it: “We all ended up colluding to pretend that this 
was all funny or benign, and that, since everyone knew about it, it must be 
OK.”121 
Moreover, a sexual relationship involving an institutional power 
disparity inherently sexualizes the work environment in ways that are often 
damaging to third parties. To be clear, I am not arguing that institutions need 
to be purged of all sexual behavior. I would argue, for example, that there 
is nothing inherently damaging about two students dating or having sex with 
one another, or two associates at a law firm, or two bartenders at the same 
restaurant.122 
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But in the context of an institutional power disparity, a sexual 
relationship has different consequences. It implies that there is more to 
succeeding in an institutional environment than doing good work. It implies 
that individuals are not viewed solely as workers or students, but also as 
potential sexual partners. Indeed, it suggests that having sex with a superior 
may well be the way to get ahead. One female bystander describes an event 
that “[d]id not happen to me but to people around me.”123 She says that a 
“[l]ab head regarded male students as future colleagues, female students as 
sexual objects. So no matter the merits, the men were treated to behaviors 
that would foster their professional careers, while women were objects of 
use or scorn. Said lab head was banging a student he also supervised.”124 
Although the student was not directly involved in any of the sexual 
behavior, the effect on her was profound. She says: “I left the field. Far less 
talented men have had excellent careers fostered by this individual.”125 
Sexual relationships in the context of institutional power disparities give 
rise to conflicts of interest. Third parties such as coworkers or students may 
worry about information-sharing across institutional power disparities.126 
Other students, for example, may rightly worry that a professor will hear 
information about them through a classmate. What if, for example, the 
classmate discloses an instance of drunken partying or an embarrassing 
hookup? One woman who had a sexual relationship with a professor 
confirms this concern. She says: “we would have sex, drink crappy beer, 
and gossip about people we both knew.”127 For many students, higher 
education is a time for experimentation and self-discovery, and concern that 
reports of their activities may make their way to a professor may change the 
institutional dynamic beyond the classroom. Imagine, for instance, a 
professor and student sitting in bed together while the professor grades 
papers for his seminar and the student recounts the extracurricular 
adventures of the student being graded. Or imagine the same professor and 
student sitting in bed together while the student fills out online course 
evaluations and the professor regales the student with tales of the colleague 
being evaluated. When a professor and a student are involved in a sexual 
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relationship, the professor’s colleagues and the student’s classmates are 
concerned about precisely these situations—sometimes justifiably so—with 
resulting harm to the quality of their experiences within the institution. 
Moreover, it is important to remember that academic institutions can also 
be workplaces, and when professors engage in sexual behavior with 
students, it has the potential to affect their colleagues. Law professor 
Michele Goodwin describes an incident that profoundly affected her early 
career.128 Barely three months into a new tenure-track position, following a 
pie-throwing contest at a law school fundraiser, she “observed a male 
colleague forcefully grab a student’s arm” and “lick the residue of cream . . 
. by twisting [her arm] behind her back, and placing his mouth on her as she 
walked by.”129 Goodwin says: “I was mortified and by the expression on the 
student’s face—she was too. She looked outraged at first, and after realizing 
it was a professor, helplessness stretched across her face. My former 
colleague’s behavior was inappropriate and repulsive, stunning for its 
brazenness and lack of professionalism.”130 
Goodwin immediately reported the incident to her dean, but for unknown 
reasons the dean delegated the responsibility of dealing with the harasser to 
an associate dean, who, as Goodwin explains, “felt conflicted about 
confronting the offending colleague”—they played cards together on the 
weekends and their spouses knew one another.131 “Ultimately, the associate 
dean felt conflicted and ill equipped to separate his professional 
responsibilities from his personal relationship.”132 The “licker” eventually 
found out that Goodwin had reported him and unleashed a vitriolic series of 
weekly, and sometimes daily, all-faculty emails about Goodwin; the emails 
contained profanity and invective. As Goodwin explains, her conscientious 
reporting “resulted in ritualistic public torment and retaliation with virtually 
no reprieve. Not only did I think about leaving my law school, but also about 
abandoning law teaching altogether.”133 While Goodwin is now a prominent 
and successful member of the legal academy, one wonders whether others 
who have spoken up in similar circumstances suffered consequences that 
made it impossible for them to similarly succeed. 
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Another example of the way sexual behavior involving an institutional 
power disparity can affect the workplace comes from an assistant professor 
in the humanities.134 She describes a disturbing incident in which a tenured 
male full professor knocked on her door, bringing with him a female 
undergraduate student.135 He announced that he was going to hug the 
undergraduate and needed “any woman to witness” it, and, before the 
professor could say anything, had “full-bear-hugged” the undergraduate 
student.136 The assistant professor stated that this was inappropriate and, “in 
a joking tone to [defuse] the student’s obvious discomfort,” added that she 
could not “undo harassment for him by virtue of being a woman.” The 
tenured professor, “still touching the student, said: ‘But it sure makes this 
look friendly, doesn’t it?’” The incident made the junior untenured 
professor unwillingly complicit in an incident of sexual harassment for the 
student and contributed to a hostile environment for the professor herself. 
Such harms may be internal and psychological, but they are no less serious 
for that reason. 
3. Gender inequality 
Thus far I have described the harms that third-party men and women 
alike experience as the result of sexual behavior involving an institutional 
power disparity. But as both qualitative and quantitative evidence 
demonstrates, the sexualization of the work environment has especially 
damaging consequences for women. 
Scholars of feminist legal theory and antidiscrimination law have 
demonstrated that sexualization of the work environment tends to harm 
women (and other underrepresented groups) more than men.137 As one 
commentator puts it, “Engaging in widespread sexual favoritism 
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characterizes women as sexual objects” at work because it “communicate[s] 
the message that the way for women to get ahead in the workplace is to 
engage in sexual conduct or that sexual solicitations are a prerequisite to 
their fair treatment.”138 The same is true at school. M. Cynara Stites explains 
that when women become “aware that sexual relationships have intruded 
into faculty-student relationships, each woman student may experience 
conflicts between her gender role as a sexual woman and her student role as 
a competent student.”139 As another researcher explains: “Once a student is 
propositioned [by a professor], all her future interactions with, and 
evaluation by, that professor are tainted and suspect, whether a promise or 
threat was ever made or carried out.”140 
The disparate harms of sexualization are not fictions invented via gender 
stereotyping. Extensive social science research has shown that women’s 
intellectual performance suffers when they are sexualized. For example, one 
study showed that simply being made aware of their bodies by trying on a 
swimming suit causes women, but not men, to experience more shame about 
their bodies and to perform less well on a math test.141 Kimberly Yuracko 
describes four key effects of “the impact of social sexualization on women”: 
First, placing women in physically revealing outfits causes them to 
focus additional energy and attention on their bodies. Second, when 
women focus additional energy on their bodies, they focus less 
energy on other tasks, resulting in diminished intellectual 
performance. Third, women’s self-objectification and subsequent 
diminished intellectual performance may occur even if women are 
not in fact being sexually viewed and evaluated by men. Simply by 
being instructed to wear certain kinds of clothes, women can be made 
to focus additional energy on their bodies at the expense of other tasks 
even if no other individual is assessing or even viewing their bodies 
in the revealing clothing. Finally, self-objectification is harmful for 
women in ways that it is not for men.142 
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The harms that Yuracko describes arise when those in power sexualize 
institutional environments such as workplaces and schools. On campus, for 
example, “When a key academic, who should be a mentor, shows a keen 
interest in a student’s body, it often sends a signal that their intellect is of 
secondary importance.”143 Research suggests that this message particularly 
affects women, regardless of whether they are the target of the professor’s 
sexual attention or merely a bystander to the professor’s attention to 
others.144 
And even when women’s actual performance does not suffer, a 
sexualized institutional environment invites others to undermine women’s 
achievements. In an environment rampant with sexual relationships in the 
context of institutional power disparities, a woman who receives a good 
grade in a class or a coveted promotion at work is subject to snide 
comments, however unwarranted: during my experience as a student and as 
an employee in various contexts, I have seen many women on the receiving 
end of comments like “you only got that promotion because the boss thinks 
you’re cute”; “what did you have to do to get that grade?” In such an 
environment, women who do well are presumed to have relied on their 
sexuality, not their intellect or work ethic.145 As one commentator explains 
in the academic context: “Even if academic evaluations are kept completely 
independent of personal involvements, it is likely that there will be an 
appearance of bias in the eyes of other students.”146 Importantly, this 
reaction from peers may occur regardless of whether a woman is actually in 
a sexual relationship with a boss or professor, or wrongly rumored to be. As 
one woman recounts: 
My postdoc adviser married his PhD student. By the time he was 
supervising me, he had been divorced. I was constantly accused by 
colleagues and other[s] in the department of having a relationship 
with him any time I went to his office or had to travel with him, since 
he was ‘known to date the women he supervised.’ My adviser never 
harassed me. Not once. Nor did he ever make any advances toward 
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me. But, my professional reputation suffered the consequences of his 
sexual reputation. Dating PhD students when you are [a] professor 
has long lasting consequences for a large sphere of women.147 
Instances such as this belie the notion that sexual behavior within the 
context of an institution is merely a matter between two consenting adults. 
As the graduate student in the previous anecdote demonstrates, the 
repercussions for third parties can be both prolonged and severe. As Sue 
Rosenberg Zalk observes: “A popular retort to condemnation of sexual 
liaisons between faculty and students makes references to the perception 
that not infrequently it is the female student who is ‘on the make’ and 
seduces the professor.”148 Men frequently express anger that women who 
sleep with their professors have access to an unfair advantage.149 
Alternatively, a sexualized institutional environment may normalize 
certain kinds of sexual behavior. A number of commentators have noted that 
when one professor has sex with a student—even if their relationship is 
consensual—that incident changes the dynamic within the institution.150 
That same professor may feel more empowered to approach other students 
in the future. Or, if the professor experiences no negative repercussions, it 
communicates to his colleagues that they are free to engage in the same 
behavior. A ripple effect occurs, in which a non-trivial number of professors 
believe it is appropriate to view the students as part of their dating pool, and 
a non-trivial number of students believe that professors are motivated not 
only by a desire to teach them, but also by a desire to have sex with them. 
Relatedly, a sexualized institutional environment desensitizes members 
of the institution to various forms of sexualized abuse. Workers who see a 
supervisor casually engage in sexual relationships with multiple 
subordinates may view it as license to cross other boundaries.151 They may 
assume the institution has a more relaxed culture when it comes to sexual 
harassment; they may feel more entitled to tell inappropriate stories; they 
may feel empowered to ask for dates aggressively and repeatedly.152 These 
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harms do not fall on women alone, but they disproportionately affect 
women.153 
Reinforcing hierarchies by tolerating sexual relationships involving an 
institutional power disparity also harms the professional trajectory of 
women in workplaces or academic fields where women are 
underrepresented. One tenure-track faculty member recounts the following 
incident: 
Shortly after I had started my [tenure track] post, I was out for drinks 
with a few members of the department. The head of department told 
a story about a professor in the department and a postgraduate 
student. This prof had touched this student inappropriately, and she 
had complained. But the HOD [head of department] then said that 
this student had previously had a (consensual) relationship with 
another member of faculty, as if to imply that her complaint about 
inappropriate touching could therefore not be taken seriously. The 
whole thing was relayed like a big joke about this prof—who is, for 
good reason, the butt of many departmental jokes—and not like the 
serious incident it really should have been treated as.154 
The faculty member describes how the incident affected her: 
The way this story was told to me made me lose confidence in my 
HOD. I felt that, if something happened to me, I couldn’t trust him to 
treat it sensitively. I also eventually stopped going to these regular 
departmental social events, because I felt really uncomfortable with 
the tone of some of the conversations.155 
The incident certainly exemplifies many of the problematic workplace 
consequences for individuals that I described in the previous section, but it 
also reveals something deeper and more structural. When third parties to 
sexual behavior become distrustful of and alienated from powerful people 
within their workplaces—something more likely to happen to women, given 
that many fields are still predominantly male—they often fail to flourish. 
This, in turn, can affect the likelihood of alienated women faculty members 
achieving greater power themselves. When a woman such as this faculty 
member distrusts the head of her department and stops attending 
departmental social events, it is far less likely that she will become powerful 
                                                 
153. Bell & McLaughlin, supra note 138, at 83 (“[A]lthough researchers acknowledge that men 
may be targets of sexual harassment and that same-sex harassment occurs, sexual harassment is most 
commonly perpetrated by men against women.”); see also id. at 84 (discussing the harms women 
experience due to harassment). 













within her department, or even the head of it herself. 
4. Institutional harm 
Institutions are more than just the aggregate of the individuals who work 
there. Sexual relationships involving an institutional power disparity harm 
the institution itself. Institutions have purposes. Indeed, we often speak of 
an institution’s “mission.” Strong institutions remain true to their missions 
and succeed in advancing toward their goals.156 When other interests 
compete or interfere with an institution’s mission, the institution is 
weakened and becomes less effective at fulfilling its mission, both in 
absolute terms and in relation to other institutions. 
The precise harm varies depending on the nature of the institution. In the 
wake of “unending clergy abuse revelations,”157 the Catholic Church 
demonstrates how sexual behavior can have devastating consequences for 
institutions.158 Scandals have cost the church over three billion dollars, and 
the church’s approval ratings have plummeted.159 Some wonder whether the 
church will ever fully recover, or even survive.160 
When a workplace is also a for-profit business, sexual behavior 
involving institutional power disparities can affect one aspect of the 
institution’s mission: the business’s profits. One need only examine how 
companies’ reputations suffer after sexual misconduct at the company 
surfaces. At Uber, for example, after a series of sexual misconduct 
allegations and other evidence of a sexist company culture, Uber’s value 
dropped ten billion dollars and stock prices fell by fifteen percent.161 One 
                                                 
156. See generally Robert Zemsky et al., Today’s Colleges Must Be Market Smart and Mission 
Centered, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 15, 2005, https://www.chronicle.com/article/Todays-Colleges-
Must-Be/35802 [https://perma.cc/VT58-42E4]. 
157. Virginia Alvino Young, For the Catholic Church, A Year of Unending Clergy Abuse 
Revelations, NAT. PUB. RADIO (Dec. 26, 2018, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/12/26/679493754/f 
or-the-catholic-church-a-year-of-unending-clergy-abuse-revelations [https://perma.cc/CRX2-WNXT]. 
158. While the primary problem with sexual abuse by clergy is—obviously—that it is morally 
repugnant, I focus for purposes of this Article on a narrow corner of the fallout from the abuse: the 
consequences for the institution of the church itself. This focus is not meant to ignore the experience or 
diminish the pain of survivors of such abuse. 
159. PEW RESEARCH CTR., GROWING SHARE OF U.S. CATHOLICS SAY FRANCIS IS “TOO 
LIBERAL,” “NAÏVE” (2018), http://www.pewforum.org/2018/03/06/pope-francis-still-highly-regarded-
in-u-s-but-signs-of-disenchantment-emerge/pf_03-06-18-pope-00-01/ [https://perma.cc/TBV9-3MD 
U]; Tom Gjelten, The Clergy Abuse Crisis Has Cost the Catholic Church $3 Billion, NAT. PUB. RADIO 
(Aug. 18,2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/18/639698062/the-clergy-abuse-crisis-has-co 
st-the-catholic-church-3-billion [https://perma.cc/M29V-T6C5]. 
160. Can the Catholic Church Survive Another Sex Abuse Scandal?, WBUR (Aug. 21, 2018), 
https://www.wbur.org/onpoint/2018/08/21/catholic-church-pope-sex-abuse-pennsylvania [https://perm 
a.cc/4KTX-4L6E]. 
161. Anita Balakrishnan, Scandals May Have Knocked $10 Billion Off Uber’s Value, a Report 
Says, CNBC, (Apr. 25, 2017, 4:03 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/25/uber-stock-price-drops-
 











commentator said: “[W]hat Uber desperately needs is a reputable leader 
who can right the ship and begin to dismantle the rule-breaking, sexist 
culture that grew up around [former CEO] Mr. Kalanick.”162 While Uber’s 
troubles were not limited to third-party harms, the company demonstrates 
how the perception of a business as sexist or frat-like can affect its value in 
multiple domains, some economic, others oriented toward justice or 
philanthropy.163 Similar financial fallout affects the companies owned by 
Harvey Weinstein164 and Steve Wynn.165 Again, while the abuses by 
Weinstein and Wynn involve not only third-party effects, such harms 
magnified the effect of the sexual abuse within the institution and the 
subsequent public condemnation.166 
Many would argue that the purpose of business institutions is not only to 
make the largest profit possible. Rather, as scholars of corporate social 
responsibility have explained, even for-profit corporations have a variety of 
missions.167 Many explicitly promote gender equality.168 Others directly 
address sexual assault and abuse.169 When an institution that addresses these 
worthy aims nonetheless fails to address an institutional culture in which 
sexual behavior involving an institutional power disparity is rampant, that 
failure affects the institution’s credibility in carrying out its mission. 
With academic institutions, part of the mission is to advance knowledge 
in the field. Universities also provide broad and deep education for 
institutional citizens. Under normal circumstances, professors communicate 
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their expertise to their students, better preparing them to function in a 
diverse society. Sexual relationships between professors and students 
subvert these goals. As Rebecca Schuman summarizes in discussing the 
academic context, “It’s not just a matter of two consenting adults’ hearts 
wanting what they want. . . . [These relationships] also affect the dynamics 
of departments, entire fields, and the very act of academic mentorship 
altogether.”170  
In particular, sexual relationships between professors and students affect 
the development of the next generation of academics. When professors 
engage in sexual relationships with their students, they alienate students of 
all genders for a variety of reasons. Some may believe the professor engages 
in favoritism and lose respect accordingly; others may avoid interacting 
with the professor because they do not wish the interaction to turn sexual. 
Moreover, when multiple professors in a particular department engage in 
sexual relationships with students, the perception may develop that the field 
is a hunting ground filled with sexual predators, or that engaging in sexual 
relationships is the only way to succeed in the field.171 In short, by engaging 
in sexual relationships with students, professors drive potential future 
contributors away from their fields. Some, for example, have linked the 
problem of sexual harassment within the field of philosophy with the fact 
that only seventeen percent of full-time philosophy faculty are women.172 
Indeed, as Schuman notes, concern about faculty-student relationships may 
have the perverse consequence of encouraging some faculty members to 
only supervise students of the same sex.173 
Finally, the gendered harms discussed in Section II.A.3 are also 
institutional harms. Gender equality is an independent good within 
institutions, both as a matter of equality and as a matter of quality. To these 
ends, sexual relationships within institutions impede progress toward 
gender equality. This harms gender equality at both the institutional and 
social level. Research has demonstrated that institutions where women are 
well-represented function more effectively and are more profitable: for 
example, one study of 21,980 publicly traded companies in ninety-one 
countries found that a profitable firm whose leadership positions were 
comprised of at least thirty percent women “could expect to add more than 
one percentage point to its net margin compared with an otherwise similar 
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firm with no female leaders.”174 Gender equality is also instrumentally 
important to many institutional stakeholders.175 Some companies have 
recently demanded that their business partners commit to goals relating to 
gender diversity, as well as other forms of diversity.176 Sexual relationships 
involving an institutional power disparity perpetuate and reinforce existing 
gender dynamics—in part by keeping women from achieving powerful 
positions in institutions; in part by driving women away from the 
institutions themselves. 
In short, sexual relationships in the context of an institutional power 
disparity cause serious harms to the institution. Institutions that fail to 
consider such harms risk compromising their mission. These harms, as well 
as those I have detailed in the other sections of this Part, amply demonstrate 
the injuries to third parties and institutions caused by sexual relationships 
involving an institutional power disparity. 
B. Third-Party Harm as a Response to Criticisms 
For as long as advocates have attempted to regulate sexual behavior 
involving an institutional power disparity, opponents have critiqued their 
efforts. Some claim that sexual behavior within institutions is a source of 
empowerment for individuals in subordinate positions, particularly 
women.177 These critics have worried about the harm to “the best and most 
meaningful pedagogical relationships” that would allegedly result from 
proscribing relationships between professors and students.178 
Other opponents of regulation have expressed concern about the effects 
of a wholly desexualized institutional environment.179 Sexual behavior itself 
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is not the problem, these critics argue. Rather, the problem arises when 
sexual behavior within an institution results in inequality. 
Yet another strand of opposition has come from those who worry that 
regulation will result in over-regulation of private and consensual sexual 
behavior. Such over-regulation, critics argue, infringes on sexual autonomy. 
Some such critics have decried “sexual paranoia” on campus.180 A related 
incarnation of the critique is often framed as the argument that the #MeToo 
movement has gone too far.181 
Yet defenders of sexual behavior involving an institutional power 
disparity focus exclusively or almost exclusively on the parties to the sexual 
behavior. As a result, they fail to engage serious harms to third parties and 
institutions documented in Section II.A. I will demonstrate in this section 
that the failure to consider third-party harm renders these critiques 
inapplicable or unconvincing. 
1. Empowerment arguments 
Some defend sexual behavior involving an institutional power disparity 
as empowering, liberating, and professionally enhancing. One such 
proponent, Jane Gallop, openly acted on this belief in her role as a professor 
until two students accused her of sexual harassment.182 The university found 
that she violated its consensual relationship policy with respect to one of the 
students, who alleged a range of behavior culminating in a public kiss at a 
lesbian bar during a conference.183 
In a book written in the aftermath of these proceedings Gallop argues 
that sexual behavior involving an institutional power disparity is not only 
unobjectionable, but also an affirmative good. She claims, first, that such 
relationships are empowering for students. Her arguments are rooted in her 
own experiences. She discloses that, while a student, she had sex with two 
of her male professors.184 She says: “To be honest, I think I wanted to get 
them into bed in order to make them more human, more vulnerable. These 
two had enormous power over me: I don’t mean their institutional position 
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but their intellectual force. . . . I wanted . . . to feel my own power in relation 
to them.”185 With these goals in mind, Gallop found the ensuing sexual 
experiences satisfying. “Screwing these guys definitely did not keep me 
from taking myself seriously as a student . . . Seducing them made me feel 
kind of cocky and that allowed me to presume I had something worth 
saying.”186 While she does not think her positive experience is universal, 
she also does not believe herself an outlier: “Although I am aware that not 
all such liaisons are so empowering for the student, I also know that my 
experience was far from unique. Lots of other smart, ambitious young 
women, many of them likewise feminist academics today, have felt 
powerful because they seduced their teachers.”187 Gallop concludes: “I balk 
at the idea that teacher-student sex is synonymous with harassment. I 
remember the feminist student I was, what I wanted and what I didn’t want, 
and I remember that it was precisely my sense of knowing what I did and 
didn’t want that made me feel strong.”188 
Moreover, Gallop argues that sexuality enhances pedagogy and is 
perhaps even essential to it. Gallop links the numerous sexual relationships 
she has had over the years with students enrolled in her classes to her 
pedagogy: “Telling teachers and students that we must not engage each 
other sexually ultimately tells us that we must limit ourselves to the confines 
of some restricted professional transaction, that we should not treat each 
other as human beings.”189 If she were required to limit her interactions with 
students that crossed into sexual territory, “I would be forced to turn away 
precisely those students most eager to work with me.”190 She concludes: “If 
schools decide to prohibit not only sex but ‘amorous relations’ between 
teacher and student, the ‘consensual amorous relation’ that will be banned 
from our campuses might just be teaching itself.”191 In short, Gallop sees 
benefits to “tricky,” “charged” personal relationships with students.192 And 
Gallop’s views extend both to institutions of higher education as places of 
education and as places of work: “A good conference is likely to be an 
eroticized workplace.”193 
I have no reason to doubt that Gallop enjoyed her experiences with her 
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own professors; we already know that some students enjoy such 
relationships because some faculty-student sexual relationships culminate 
in happy marriages—or, at least, relatively long-lasting marriages. But even 
if the student in some faculty-student sexual relationships enjoys intellectual 
and psychological benefits, that does not require embracing such 
relationships as a general principle. The question, rather, is whether the 
benefits to the small subset of students who engage in consensual sexual 
behavior with faculty and benefit from it outweigh the harms of such 
relationships to all the other students, to other third parties, and to 
institutions. Even assuming for the sake of argument that some women may 
be empowered by engaging in sexual behavior involving an institutional 
power dynamic, or that sexual behavior enhances some pedagogy,194 this 
argument overlooks evidence demonstrating that the overall consequences 
for women are negative when the calculus takes account of third parties.195 
While Gallop describes benefits resulting from her own experience and the 
experiences of a handful of others, she does no comparative analysis to 
explain how those benefits outweigh the serious harms I have catalogued in 
Section II.A. The purported benefits to linking sexuality and pedagogy that 
Gallop enumerates thus fail to address the many harms to third parties that 
result from sexual behavior involving professors and students, range from 
sexual favoritism to reduced trust between students and professors to the 
distraction of a sexualized environment.196 
Ultimately, Gallop’s arguments simply fail to engage the third-party 
harms I have catalogued in Section II.A. She has literally nothing to say 
about the other students in the classes she taught while she was engaged in 
a sexual relationship with one of their classmates. Moreover, while Gallop 
says she is confident in her ability to grade her student sexual partners 
objectively, research offers reason to be skeptical. We are rarely the best 
judges of our own susceptibility to bias.197 
When Gallop does allude to third parties, her comments, perhaps 
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inadvertently, reveal the very harms I have raised in this Article. She 
mentions a joke she told at a conference—“graduate students are my sexual 
preference”—and acknowledges that the joke fell flat. Further, she later 
learned that students saw her differently after her comment, which caused 
some students (perhaps unsurprisingly) to think she was trying to sleep with 
them.198 She also references third parties while discussing the kiss with her 
graduate student,199 but focuses entirely on the utility of the third parties to 
her, rather than acknowledging the effect of her behavior on them.200 She 
says that the kiss was performative, and the whole point was that it took 
place in front of other people.201 But she does not consider the fact that some 
of the third parties might have been unwilling to be sexualized; that they 
might have been concerned about the effect on their careers of a refusal to 
participate in sexual behavior; that they might have been concerned about 
possible favoritism toward the student she kissed; that they might have been 
concerned about the atmosphere at the conference; that they might have 
been worried about how her “performance” affected the reputation of her 
colleagues or her institution.202 Third parties regularly express all of these 
concerns about sexual behavior between faculty and students, and Gallop’s 
refusal to engage these concerns as a possible objection to the benefits she 
sees is a refusal to acknowledge that sexual behavior between faculty and 
students has the tangible, material consequences for third parties that I have 
articulated at length in Section II.A. 
Few other than Gallop have gone so far as to argue that sexual behavior 
in the context of an institutional power disparity is affirmatively good. 
Catherine Hakim defends sexuality in institutional environments, 
particularly in the workplace, arguing that what she calls “erotic capital”—
one’s sexual charm203—“exposes one aspect of life where women 
undoubtedly have an advantage over men.”204 She argues that “radical 
feminism has gone down a dead-end by adopting . . . ideas that belittle 
women’s allure”205 She explains that such “erotic capital” provides an 
advantage in the workplace: 
In white collar jobs, the ability to be an agreeable colleague, easy to 
talk to, charming and friendly, cheerful and cooperative, is a great 
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asset. These skills are especially important for managers and 
supervisors, people dealing with clients and negotiations. Such 
talents merge into the social skills that make someone an attractive 
person in private life and can include the ability to flirt in a relaxed, 
nonthreatening way, without crossing the line into sexual 
harassment.206 
Some of what Hakim describes is normal collegial behavior. But some of 
it—the allegedly “relaxed, non-threatening” flirting, for example—may 
well not be. What feels relaxed and non-threatening to the boss may feel 
very different to a subordinate. Hakim does not explicitly advocate that 
people should have sex with their colleagues, whether more or less 
powerful. But she does argue that indiscriminately sexualizing the work 
environment—regardless of who does it, and to whom—is a good thing.207 
Again, my concern lies with the third parties and institutions who suffer 
from sexual behavior in the context of an institutional power disparity. 
These third parties would suffer collateral damage if people began to do 
what Hakim ostensibly thinks they should do. Women who for whatever 
reason do not want to use their sexuality—or “erotic capital”—to advance 
in the workplace would be faced with an unappealing decision. Either they 
would have to put aside their personal preferences about how to deploy their 
own sexuality or else they would face possible damage to their career.208 
Moreover, even though Hakim does not explicitly acknowledge third 
parties, her belief that women can gain an advantage by using their sexuality 
implies harm to third parties. After all, for sleeping to the top to be effective, 
the person doing the sleeping must be getting an advantage over someone. 
Not every instance of sexual behavior in the workplace or university 
causes harm. But in order to evaluate the harm of a regime that allows such 
behavior, we cannot focus only on the participants in the behavior. Rather, 
such behavior sets a standard that creates both costs and benefits. To 
evaluate such behavior rationally, we need to consider the effect of this 
sexualization on third parties and institution. Focusing solely on the way 
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sexual behavior may empower or advantage its participants fails to engage 
these other important issues. 
2. Desexualization arguments 
Another critique of regulation of sexual behavior involving an 
institutional power disparity is that desexualizing institutions is a net loss. 
Vicki Schultz has articulated the general concerns associated with 
“desexualizing” or “sanitizing” the workplace in a seminal pair of 
articles.209 Schultz argues that proponents of strong measures to combat 
sexual harassment in the workplace wrongly emphasize sexuality as 
inherently problematic rather than focusing on the structural and other 
institutional barriers that actually create and reinforce gender hierarchy in 
the workplace.210 For example, she explains, “courts have tended to single 
out sexual advances and other conduct of a sexual nature for disapproval, 
and have tended to exonerate even serious patterns of sexist misconduct that 
could not be easily characterized as sexually motivated.”211 She worries that 
an unusual coalition of judges, feminists, and managers212 are wrongly 
preoccupied with eliminating all traces of sexuality from the workplace, 
“even benign forms of sexual conduct that are not linked to sex 
discrimination on the job.”213 Instead, Schultz argues, reformers should 
focus on dismantling the various factors that give rise to inequality in the 
first place, such as underrepresentation of women in some professions or 
segregation of women within particular work environments.214 Such 
conditions, she argues, cause much more harm than a few sexual jokes or 
remarks.215 
Moreover, purging sexuality from the workplace actually harms 
workers’ well-being. Schultz writes: “Workplace sexuality isn’t solely a 
source of danger and disruption—it’s also a source of vitality, creativity, 
and power. For many people, the sexual energy that work generates will be 
one of the most valued aspects of their work lives—one we should not 
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Schultz’s research is largely convincing. She offers compelling support 
for the claim that courts often focus on sexuality when they should be 
focusing on sex discrimination.217 She is also persuasive that eradicating all 
sexual expression in the workplace is neither necessary nor desirable.218 
Some sexual behavior in the workplace (or, extrapolating from Schultz’s 
work, in other institutions) is harmless and even beneficial: for example, in 
most instances consensual sexual relationships between peers need not be 
regulated, such as relationships between two associates at a law firm, or 
between classmates at a university. And Schultz correctly observes that 
many non-consensual workplace sexual relationships are already addressed 
by Title VII law,219 although existing law is often too narrow in scope and 
presents practical obstacles to plaintiffs’ recovery.220 
Schultz’s research addresses the workplace in general: she does not focus 
specifically on the considerable effect on third parties that results from 
sexual behavior involving an institutional power disparity. This Article 
therefore aims to show that Schultz’s generally compelling reservations 
about desexualizing the workplace should not apply to the specific subset 
of sexual behavior within workplaces and other institutions that involves a 
power disparity between the participants. 
As I explained in Part II.A, this subset of workplace sexual behavior 
harms third parties and reinforces workplace inequality. Relationships 
between bosses and subordinates—even if fully consensual and enjoyable 
for the participants—raise many third-party concerns. They risk favoritism, 
disrupt the workplace dynamic, disparately sexualize female workers, and 
compromise the institutional mission. 
 Concerns about desexualization of the workplace focus almost 
exclusively on the consent of the parties involved. When it comes to sexual 
behavior involving an institutional power disparity, then, this analysis does 
not take account of situations that affect third parties and institutions 
themselves. For example, Schultz is concerned that some companies design 
policies “to ensure that even fully consensual interactions not directed at the 
complainant do not offend a third party . . . .”221 When such consensual 
sexual behavior involves an institutional power disparity, however, the 
concern for third parties is considerably greater. Even if conduct is 
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consensual and enjoyable for its participants, it may still be harmful to 
others. For example, a relationship between a partner and an associate at a 
law firm could disadvantage and alienate other associates who are not 
sexually involved with partners.222 Similarly, a professor dating a current 
student may spark concerns about favoritism in grading—particularly in 
environments such as law schools that adhere to a strict curve—or create an 
atmosphere of intimidation for untenured or non-tenure-track professors 
who have to grade a tenured colleague’s sexual partner. 
Some critics of desexualization fear that employers will over-regulate. 
Schultz, for instance, notes that “many feminists extended their arguments 
for prohibiting sexual harassment more broadly to condemn a wide range of 
sexual conduct, even consensual conduct that would not meet the legal 
definition of harassment.”223 But the legal definition of harassment should 
be built around our understanding of problematic workplace conduct, not 
the other way around. Thus feminist efforts to prohibit “consensual conduct 
that would not meet the legal definition of harassment” and employers who 
“censor individual employees’ conduct well before the legal threshold is 
met” may actually be engaging in efforts to shift the regulation of employee 
sexual behavior to the normatively correct place.224 If the law currently 
prohibits certain behavior, that does not mean that all other behavior is 
unproblematic. In particular, it does not mean that sexual behavior involving 
an institutional power disparity is unproblematic. 
A number of critics even suggest that companies must allow workplace 
relationships as the only realistic alternative to unhappy singleness or 
celibacy for employees who work particularly long hours: “As a practical 
matter, these people may have to find potential partners through their 
employment. If prohibitions against workplace dating become universal, 
many people may find it difficult if not impossible to find marriage partners 
or to secure other long-term or short-term sexual relationships.”225 Others 
have made a similar argument in the context of university professors.226 
Many proponents of such arguments are talking about workplace dating in 
general, not about sexual behavior involving an institutional power 
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disparity. As a result, institutions that implement policies prohibiting only 
the latter behavior seem like an odd target for this complaint. If the concern 
really is that people are so busy working that they literally cannot have sex 
unless they have sex with the people they supervise or teach, capitalism 
itself seems a better target—not regulation of the narrow set of relationships 
most likely to cause harm to third parties.227 
Many desexualization critics do not address possible harms to third 
parties. With typical thoughtfulness, Schultz does consider this concern, and 
frames the consequences for third parties as a mixed bag: 
In terms of larger organizational effects, employees report that 
workplace romance can create excitement among the work group, 
enhance communication and cooperation, enhance teamwork, 
simulate [sic] creativity, and create a happier work environment. On 
the negative side, employees report that romance may take time away 
from work, increase gossip, and create concerns about favoritism 
among coworkers.228 
Schultz also acknowledges the concerns inherent in institutional power 
disparities. At one point she observes that “most experts believe supervisor-
subordinate relationships present the greatest risk.”229 Similarly, she attests 
to the “serious concern” that “if organizations do not have rules against 
dating and sexual relationships between supervisors and employees, there 
will be nothing to prevent supervisors from exercising personal favoritism 
toward employees with whom they are romantically involved” while noting 
that the issue is not confined to dating relationships and that supervisors 
“may also develop nonsexual attachments that predispose them to favor 
particular employees.”230 Mary Anne Case has highlighted a similar concern 
and proposed a general “anti-nepotism” policy that would include both 
sexual and non-sexual favoritism.231 While this Article does not address 
non-sexual favoritism, the point for present purposes that there are 
distinctive problems with sexual relationships I am concerned about here—
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specifically, those involving an institutional power disparity. 
Ultimately, the work of Schultz and other scholars who warn against 
proscribing sexuality in the workplace and other institutions is largely or 
perhaps even entirely reconcilable with workplace policies that regulate 
sexual behavior involving an institutional power disparity. Schultz’s 
concern, for example, lies with gender inequality in the workplace, not with 
sexuality qua sexuality. Based on the evidence discussed in Part II.A, sexual 
behavior involving an institutional power disparity produces such gender 
inequality and should therefore be subject to regulation. Although it does 
not include a comprehensive discussion of third-party harms, Schultz’s 
work is not inherently antithetical to a legal regime that countenances such 
harms.232 In short, I think we can have it both ways: a workplace or school 
can create space for participants to engage in sexual behavior, with the 
benefits Schultz describes, without requiring it to tolerate sexual 
relationships involving an institutional power disparity and the myriad 
problems such relationships create for third parties. 
3. Regulatory arguments 
A final objection to regulation of sexual behavior involving an 
institutional power disparity is that regulation of intimate lives is inherently 
problematic. One strand of this objection argues that regulation of 
consensual sexual behavior is problematic because it intrudes on individual 
liberty in the intimate sphere of sexual behavior. Another strand criticizes 
regulation on the ground that it infantilizes women and ultimately 
perpetuates gender inequality. 
The first strand of critics argue that regulation of sexual behavior sweeps 
too broadly. In their article, “The Sex Bureaucracy,”233 Jacob Gersen and 
Jeannie Suk protest the over-regulation of sexual behavior.234 They argue 
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that regulation of sexual discrimination and sexual violence have expanded 
to the point that they encompass “ordinary sexual behavior,” which they 
define as “voluntary adult sexual conduct that does not harm others.”235 
Gersen and Suk use higher education as a case study, although they 
emphasize that the “sex bureaucracy” extends to other institutions, such as 
primary and secondary schools and the military.236 
Gersen and Suk do not explicitly discuss the subset of sexual behavior 
that involves an institutional power disparity, such as relationships between 
professors and students. Rather, they focus on regulation of sexual behavior 
between students—an important topic beyond the scope of this Article. My 
analysis therefore does not necessarily run counter to Gersen and Suk’s 
views, but rather uses their helpful framing of anti-regulatory arguments to 
demonstrate why such arguments should not apply to sexual behavior 
involving an institutional power disparity. 
Arguments against regulation of consensual sexual behavior often do not 
analyze the way in which institutional power disparity affects third parties. 
Gersen and Suk compellingly identify a number of flaws in the way the Title 
IX process is implemented.237 They also argue that we should not regulate 
“voluntary adult sex that does not harm others”238—emphasis mine—
without elaborating on how we tell whether sex harms others or what we 
should do if it does. These third-party concerns are paramount in sexual 
behavior involving an institutional power disparity—my primary concern 
in this Article—yet anti-regulatory arguments offer little guidance for how 
to determine whether voluntary sex does or does not harm others.  
Without discussing third-party harms, we cannot address two important 
tensions inherent in the argument against regulation. One is that the 
government already regulates or prohibits sexual activity between 
consenting adults in a wide range of circumstances: when the sex involves 
close relatives;239 when the sex involves certain professional relationships 
such as a judge and an attorney appearing before the judge;240 when the sex 
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occurs in public;241 when the sex occurs between military members of 
different rank;242 when the sex occurs between a prison guard and a 
prisoner;243 when sex involves an exchange of money.244 In each of these 
instances, at least part of the reason for governmental intervention is likely 
the risk of harm to third parties or institutions.245 
Moreover, the government already intervenes in consensual adult sexual 
interactions in countless ways even where it does not prohibit that activity. 
Sex education in public schools instills beliefs and practices that people 
carry with them into their consensual sexual interactions as adults.246 
Insurance coverage of birth control affects the circumstances and 
consequences of consensual sex.247 Divorce laws that take into account 
sexual behavior such as adultery likewise regulate consensual adult sexual 
interactions.248 Criminal laws that regulate prostitution even where it is 
legal,249 zoning laws that regulate strip clubs and adult stores that sell books 
or sex toys,250 public decency laws that regulate what clothing is required in 
public,251 and laws regulating the availability of pornography on the 
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Internet252 all intervene in consensual adult sexual behavior. The list could 
go on for quite a while. 
Moreover, all of these interventions take place at least in part because of 
a concern for third parties, and most of these interventions have been around 
for a long time. My point is not that all or any of these laws is normatively 
justified, but rather that the bare fact that the government or other entities 
regulate consensual sexual behavior is not new or anomalous. And without 
discussion of harms to third parties, we cannot evaluate any particular 
instance of regulation, including, specific to this Article, regulation of 
sexual behavior involving an institutional power disparity. 
Some scholars have echoed the concern for regulation, but with 
particular concern that the paternalism inherent in such regulation 
infantilizes and ultimately harms women.253 A recent proponent of this view 
is Laura Kipnis, who does not see sexual behavior involving faculty and 
students as harmful—or, to be more precise, she does not see it as inherently 
more harmful than any other sexual behavior.254 She recalls her own 
experiences with professors during college, explaining, “When I was in 
college, hooking up with professors was more or less part of the 
curriculum.”255 She writes: 
The gulf between students and faculty wasn’t a shark-filled moat; a 
misstep wasn’t fatal. We partied together, drank and got high 
together, slept together. The teachers may have been older and more 
accomplished, but you didn’t feel they could take advantage of you 
because of it. How would they?256 
Kipnis describes the ban on consensual faculty-student relationships at 
Northwestern University, where she teaches, as “irritating.”257 “It’s been 
barely a year since the Great Prohibition took effect in my own workplace. 
Before that, students and professors could date whomever we wanted; the 
next day we were off limits to one another . . . .”258 She adds that “the 
residues of the wild old days are everywhere,” referring to several couples 
on her campus comprised of a professor and a former student, as well as 
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“the legions who’ve dated a graduate student or two in their day—plenty of 
female professors in that category, too—in fact, I’m one of them.”259 
Moreover, Kipnis objects to what she describes as the vulnerability and 
paranoia of students who object to various forms of sexual behavior on 
campus (some involving institutional power disparities and some not). 
Kipnis seems to have the mistaken impression that no one except her has 
pointed out what she describes as the self-perceived vulnerability of many 
college students and especially women. She says: “The feminism I 
identified with as a student stressed independence and resilience. In the 
intervening years, the climate of sanctimony about student vulnerability has 
grown too thick to penetrate; no one dares question it lest you’re labeled 
antifeminist. Or worse, a sex criminal.”260 Kipnis’s claim that “no one dares 
question” the supposed climate of deference to student vulnerability seems 
at best exaggerated. After all, there she is questioning it in the The Chronicle 
of Higher Education, and quite a large number of other people have 
similarly dared to question.261 
Kipnis then suggests that giving too much credence to student 
vulnerability is harmful, even when those students are engaged in sexual 
relationships with their professors. She asks: 
[W]hat do we expect will become of students, successfully cocooned 
from uncomfortable feelings, once they leave the sanctuary of 
academe for the boorish badlands of real life? What becomes of 
students so committed to their own vulnerability, conditioned to 
imagine they have no agency, and protected from unequal power 
arrangements in romantic life?262 
Kipnis’s argument about encouraging agency resonates when she uses it to 
propose such practical measures as self-defense classes and unlearning 
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socialized feminine passivity.263 But to the extent that she takes issue with 
feelings she views as wrong or unjustified, the critique is less persuasive. 
She says of women: “we typically also feel ourselves to be far more 
vulnerable to sexual danger than we are—and I can think of no better way 
to subjugate women than to convince us that assault is around every 
corner.”264 
But a close reading of Kipnis’s work reveals a view that some people’s 
feelings matter more than others, as well as a view that her own feelings are 
an uncontroversially correct way of viewing the world. She critiques 
professors and students who discourage certain forms of sexual behavior as 
“ideologues of feelings,”265 and disparages the notion that “what counts as 
rape is whatever the victims ‘feel’ counts as rape.”266 Yet she also credits 
the feelings of several men involved in sexual assault proceedings. She 
sympathetically portrays a student expelled from college for sexual 
misconduct who “assumes he’ll never get into another school and is 
adamant he’ll never return to the previous one, even if he could. His life is 
wrecked, he feels.”267 (Emphasis mine.) She likewise credits Peter Ludlow’s 
emotional decision to resign rather than continue facing sexual assault 
proceedings against him, as well as his decision to move to Mexico to save 
money because “he’d pretty much lost everything at that point.”268 By 
Kipnis’s own standards, this seems an odd characterization of an adult 
man’s decision to voluntarily resign a tenured position—after all, Ludlow 
resigned because he felt he had lost everything, not that he actually had, 
given that no final decision had been rendered against him. 
Kipnis also credits her own feelings throughout her book. In arguing that 
faculty-student relationships are unproblematic, for example: “[y]ou didn’t 
feel your teachers were remote, all-powerful beings—they were messy, 
opinionated, depressed, monumentally flawed.”269 (Again, emphasis mine.) 
She likewise credits, without self-examination, her own decision not to read 
emails about what she writes, including those from colleagues;270 her belief 
that a professor cannot possibly force a student to drink;271 and most of all 
her own feelings about the Title IX process as the result of complaints made 
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against her, 272 which she describes as an “inquisition.”273 
The point is not that Kipnis’s feelings are wrong.274 The point is that an 
anti-paternalist argument must hinge on more than a subjective belief that 
some feelings are more justifiable than others. In short, the sexual 
vulnerability that Kipnis identifies as endemic in institutions of higher 
education these days cannot be dismissed simply because it involves 
feelings with which Kipnis does not personally identify.275 Making good 
policy about sexual behavior involving an institutional power disparity 
requires examining the empirical realities of the institutions involved. If we 
are to introduce feelings into the equation—and I think we should do so 
honestly and openly—then we should look at everyone’s feelings, including 
those of third parties. 
The need for empirical examination not tethered exclusively to any 
particular group’s feelings brings us full circle. Such an examination 
requires consideration of not only the people involved in sexual behavior, 
but also the consequences for the bystanders to that behavior and the 
institutions within which the behavior occurs. Sexual behavior involving an 
institutional power disparity harms them too. And the failure to consider 
third party and institutional harms renders these critiques unpersuasive. The 
remainder of the Article, then, will discuss the landscape of legal, 
regulatory, and institutional responses to third-party harms arising from 
sexual behavior involving an institutional power disparity. 
III. CURRENT REGULATION 
This Part surveys the legal mechanisms relating to the third-party harms 
of sexual behavior involving an institutional power disparity. It concludes 
that some third-party effects are addressed piecemeal by various laws, 
regulations, and institutional codes, but that none of these legal instruments 
address third-party harms in a comprehensive way. 
A. Criminal and Tort Law 
Many would like to think of institutions such as workplaces and schools 
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as beyond the realm of sexual assault. The problems there, some would 
prefer to believe, are more subtle and nuanced: off-color jokes, overly 
persistent invitations to date, perhaps standing too close to someone. 
But many of the stories that have arisen from #MeToo are startlingly 
violent. Many incidents involving Harvey Weinstein involve sexual assault, 
for example.276 Some evidence suggests that the picture may be even more 
disturbing in blue-collar workplaces. For example, a recent article reported 
that eighty percent of agricultural workers have been sexually assaulted or 
know someone who has.277 
In the most extreme instances, third parties to sexual relationships may 
be able to press charges for criminal conduct that involves them. Daryl 
Hannah’s make-up artist, for example, might have been the victim of 
menacing or harassment by Harvey Weinstein.278 Likewise, other workers 
or students who attempt to shield their colleagues or classmates from a 
powerful person’s sexual advances may themselves become victims of 
crimes. Criminal law does not seem to be the best fit for most third-party 
situations, but in extreme situations it serves as one possibility. 
As with criminal law, tort law may provide a remedy in a relatively small 
set of extreme situations. Consider a worker who listens and watches as a 
boss sexually harasses a colleague day after day. If the harassment is 
sufficiently serious or egregious, in some states, the colleague might be able 
to bring a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Whatever remedies tort law might provide for a third party to a claim of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, it also comes with difficulties. 
Most workers and students, for example, cannot pay for a lawyer up front, 
and might struggle to find someone to represent them on contingency given 
the unlikelihood of large damage awards in most cases. Still, like criminal 
law, tort law may provide a fit in some circumstances. 
B. Antidiscrimination Law 
Possible sources of liability stemming from antidiscrimination law 
include Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972. Each one provides some opportunity to 
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address the third-party harms caused by sexual behavior involving an 
institutional power disparity, yet each one also includes significant 
weaknesses. 
1. Title VII 
Some third-party claims arising from sexual behavior involving an 
institutional power disparity are actionable under Title VII. That statute 
makes it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any individual 
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.”279 To establish a prima facie case for discrimination under 
Title VII, a plaintiff must establish four well-known elements: (1) 
membership in a protected class; (2) qualification for a job (or promotion, 
etc.) for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) employer’s 
rejection of the plaintiff despite their qualifications; and (4) other applicants 
with the same or lesser qualifications were hired (promoted, etc.) instead of 
the applicant.280 
Claims of sexual harassment also fall under Title VII. In Meritor Savings 
Bank v. Vinson,281 the Supreme Court adopted guidelines promulgated by 
the EEOC in recognizing two forms of sexual harassment: quid pro quo 
harassment, meaning that some aspect of employment is predicated on 
participation in sexual conduct; and hostile work environment harassment, 
when sexual conduct “has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering 
with an individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, 
or offensive work environment.”282 
Title VII has been used to address some third-party harms resulting from 
sexual behavior involving an institutional power disparity. Some courts 
have recognized that sexual favoritism can constitute a form of hostile 
environment claim.283 But this is so only when instances of sexual 
favoritism are widespread in a workplace. 
The California Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Department of 
Corrections illustrates the level of conduct that is sufficient for a court to 
conclude that sexual favoritism is “widespread.”284 The plaintiffs, Edna 
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Miller and Frances Mackey, filed suit against the California Department of 
Corrections alleging sexual harassment and discrimination.285 While Miller 
and Mackey were employed at the Valley State Prison for Women (VSPW), 
the chief deputy prison warden, Lewis Kuykendall, engaged in well-known 
sexual relationships with three subordinate female employees.286 The 
plaintiffs alleged that Kuykendall favored his sexual partners in a number 
of ways: he had them transferred to the VSPW from the previous facility 
where he worked; one reported to him rather than to her immediate 
supervisor; another received a promotion over Miller.287 For their part, 
Kuykendall’s female sexual partners bragged about their power over Miller 
as a result of their relationships.288 In various permutations, they also 
retaliated against Miller by undermining her authority, requiring her to 
perform unpleasant work, criticizing her work, and threatening to retaliate 
further when Miller brought various complaints to Kuykendall.289 
Eventually Internal Affairs was involved after the workplace was deemed 
“out of control.”290 The Miller court concluded that, under these 
circumstances, sexual favoritism was so widespread that it created an 
actionable hostile work environment. It concluded that “an employee may 
establish an actionable claim of sexual harassment . . . by demonstrating that 
widespread sexual favoritism was severe or pervasive enough to alter his or 
her working conditions and create a hostile work environment.”291 It also 
indicated that widespread sexual favoritism could sustain a claim of quid 
pro quo harassment if it created a reasonable belief that a supervisor would 
only promote employees who engaged in sexual relationships with them.292 
Miller is largely an outlier, perhaps due to its unusual facts. Other courts, 
however, have held in favor of a Title VII plaintiff whose claim is based on 
sexual favoritism.293 In Broderick v. Ruder, for example, the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia held that sexual relationships 
between two of the plaintiff’s supervisors and their secretaries, as well as 
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promotion of a staff attorney to whom another supervisor was attracted, 
established a sexual environment that was “so pervasive” that it could 
establish Title VII liability.294 
In a number of other cases, however, courts held that favoring a sexual 
partner did not contribute to a hostile work environment. As the Seventh 
Circuit has stated: “Title VII does not, however, prevent employers from 
favoring employees because of personal relationships. Whether the 
employer grants employment perks to an employee because she is a protegé, 
an old friend, a close relative or a love interest, that special treatment is 
permissible as long as it is not based on an impermissible classification”295 
A number of other courts have reached similar conclusions.296 The line, 
therefore, currently lies between sexual favoritism that is “widespread” and 
sexual favoritism that is not. 
Title VII also applies in the higher education setting because, for many 
people, institutions of higher education are workplaces. Although much of 
the focus on sexual behavior within institutions of higher education lies on 
professor-student relationships and their effect on other students, there is no 
question that the effects of such relationships extend beyond students and 
include other professors, staff, and other members of the academic 
community. Recall, for example, the retaliation against Michele Goodwin 
attempting to seek a remedy against a tenured colleague who licked a 
student, or the junior professor whose senior colleague forced her to witness 
him hug a student as an implied defense against sexual harassment.297 
Goodwin’s experience likely would be sufficiently severe to sustain a 
hostile environment claim under Title VII, while the single incident of 
hugging likely would not, but one can see how the aggregation of several 
similar such incidents might do so. Third-party harms resulting from sexual 
behavior involving an institutional power dynamic extend to the university 
as a workplace and can result in Title VII liability there under current 
doctrine. 
2. Title IX 
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Title IX prohibits sex discrimination in institutions of higher education 
that receive federal funding.298 It allows individuals who have suffered 
adverse consequences as the result of a school’s non-compliance with the 
federal mandate against sex discrimination to file suit. As a result, the law 
prohibits sexual harassment—because sexual harassment is a form of sex 
discrimination—as well as sexual assault and other forms of non-consensual 
sexual contact.299 Title IX does not, however prohibit consensual 
relationships between faculty members and students. Applying Title IX in 
situations involving consent has proven difficult: for example, a professor 
might perceive a student to be consenting—perhaps even affirmatively and 
enthusiastically—yet later learn that the student felt coerced into 
participation in sexual behavior.300 Courts have held that the same standards 
for sex discrimination, quid pro quo harassment, and hostile environment 
apply in the Title VII context as in the Title IX context. Presumably that 
means that the same standards would apply with respect to third-party 
claims of sexual favoritism, although to my knowledge such a claim has not 
yet been brought against a school. Carrying the parallel to its logical 
extension, a department in which multiple professors are engaged in sexual 
relationships with students might support a Miller-style claim, but under 
Title IX instead of Title VII. Given the frequency of professor-student 
relationships and the manner in which they affect the classroom and 
academic environment,301 the environment may be ripe for a Title IX claim. 
C. Regulations 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) plays a role 
in determining the way the law treats sexual harassment within the 
workplace as an institution. This also affects academia to the extent that 
academic institutions are workplaces. Moreover, the norms communicated 
by the EEOC affect broader social thinking about sexual behavior within 
institutions and can influence the way sexual behavior involving a power 
disparity is treated in academia. 
The EEOC has taken a limited but influential role in shaping the 
development of sexual harassment law as it relates to third parties. In 1999, 
the EEOC issued a policy statement stating that sexual favoritism, standing 
alone, is insufficient to sustain a Title VII claim. The Policy Statement said: 
“An isolated instance of favoritism towards a ‘paramour’ (or a spouse, or a 
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friend) may be unfair, but does not discriminate against women or men in 
violation of Title VII, since both are disadvantaged for reasons other than 
their genders.”302  
Although EEOC policy statements are not binding, a number of courts 
have relied on this guidance, including both decisions denying third-party 
plaintiff’s claims under Title VII303 and decisions allowing recovery in such 
instances.304 In both types of cases, courts have hewed closely to the Policy 
Statement. In particular, the California Supreme Court relied on the Policy 
Statement in holding for the plaintiffs in Miller, the seminal case on liability 
for sexual favoritism.305 Advisory or not, the Policy Statement has 
unquestionably shaped doctrine. 
Finally, other regulations, such as those promulgated by the Department 
of Education Office for Civil Rights in order to implement Title IX, may 
influence the way that workplace laws are implemented where the 
workplace in question is a school.306 They may also affect the limitations 
placed on some forms of faculty-student relationships.307 
D. Institutional Policies 
Workplaces and schools have established a wide array of policies 
pertaining to supervisor-subordinate relationships and faculty-student 
relationships and the haphazard manner in which such policies are 
enforced.308 Both in the workplace and in institutions of higher education, 
the policies vary considerably in scope and enforcement. 
 
1. Workplace codes 
A little over a third of employers have adopted policies regulating 
consensual relationships among employees.309 In 2013, the Society for 
Human Resource Management surveyed 555 companies, finding that 36% 
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of companies had a written policy and 6% had a verbal policy regarding 
consensual relationships.310 This figure more than doubled from 2005, when 
only 25% of companies had such a policy.311 As of the publication of this 
Article, I know of no quantitative research about such policies in the post-
#MeToo era, but from anecdotes I suspect that such policies have increased 
in number and restrictiveness. 
Nearly every workplace that had a policy prohibited relationships 
between supervisors and subordinates.312 Forty-five percent also prohibited 
relationships between people of significantly different rank, even if neither 
is in the other’s chain of command, which is also a notable increase from 
16% in 2005.313 Where relationships between workers of different rank are 
not prohibited, employers often adopt what is known as a “discouragement” 
policy—one that does not actually prohibit such relationships or prescribe 
consequences for them, but rather points out some of the possible negative 
consequences and notes that the company prefers that workers refrain from 
such relationship.314 
Commentators have discussed the best way to draft policies relating to 
consensual sexual relationships within workplaces. Some see a host of legal 
and practical problems and worry that the contracts invade privacy and will 
not prevent abuse.315 Others are more optimistic.316 Regardless, most agree 
that when a policy prohibits certain relationships, the responsibility for the 
relationship should lie with the supervisor or more senior person.317 In 
corporate America, the penalty for violating a company policy on intra-
office relationships can be severe—in 2017, for example, venture capital 
company Greylock asked for and received its COO’s resignation after 
investigating what it ultimately found to be an “inappropriate” relationship, 
even though some outlets reported that the relationship was consensual.318  
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A number of companies’ internal relationship policies have recently 
received public scrutiny. Uber, for example, was widely criticized for a “frat 
house” memo319 sent by former CEO Travis Kalanick to Uber employees 
before a company trip to Florida, which included the statement: 
Do not have sex with another employee UNLESS a) you have asked 
that person for that privilege and they have responded with an 
emphatic ‘YES! I will have sex with you’ AND b) the two (or more) 
of you do not work in the same chain of command.320 
The memo went on: “Yes, that means that Travis will be celibate on this 
trip. #CEOLife #FML.”321 Setting aside the tone of the memo, two features 
stand out. First, the memo appears to communicate a company policy 
prohibiting sexual relationships involving people who supervise one 
another. And second, although the memo is not exactly a model of 
sensitivity and political correctness, the standard it sets out appears to be 
one of affirmative consent—that is, Uber requires more than merely non-
criminal behavior. 
Facebook and Google have also ventured into new territory in employee 
regulation by adopting a one-invitation policy with respect to dating.322 If 
someone asks a coworker for a date and is turned down—including facially 
ambiguous responses like “I’m busy”—the companies prohibit them from 
asking again.323 In general, many companies have begun to develop more 
assertive policies in the wake of the revelations prompted by #MeToo. 
While human resource experts have long advised companies to discourage 
relationships involving supervisors and subordinates,324 more recently many 
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of them have gone further. One attorney who represents employers has 
begun to advise that they “put strict rules in place barring managers from 
dating anyone further down in the organization, with firing as a potential 
consequence”; according to him, every company has taken him up on this 
advice.325 In sum, #MeToo has prompted many workplaces to acknowledge 
that the status quo simply is not working for their company as an institution. 
Such workplaces have considered new approaches as a result. 
2. School codes 
On campus, codes governing sexual relationships among members of the 
school community fall along a spectrum.326 As with workplaces, one broad 
division is between “prohibition policies,”327 which ban all sexual 
relationships, and “discouragement policies,”328 which enumerate the 
problems with such relationships but stop short of prohibiting them. These 
policies are further complicated by the many statuses of individuals within 
a university, including undergraduate students, graduate students, post-
doctoral students, adjunct professors, long term contract professors, 
untenured tenure-track professors, tenured professors, administrators, and 
various staff. 
The Association of American University Professors (AAUP) advises 
against sexual relationships between students and faculty members but does 
not say colleges and universities should prohibit them. It says: “In their 
relationships with students, members of the faculty are expected to be aware 
of their professional responsibilities and to avoid apparent or actual conflict 
of interest, favoritism, or bias. When a sexual relationship exists, effective 
steps should be taken to ensure unbiased evaluation or supervision of the 
student.”329 The AAUP’s primary concerns appear to be with conflicts of 
interest and favoritism—concerns that resonate with concerns about harm 
to third parties, although they do not exhaust the list of third-party harms. 
Some schools have implemented a total ban on sexual relationships 
between professors and undergraduates.330 Harvard, for example, falls into 
                                                 
boss or reassign your direct report to another team”)(internal quotations marks omitted). 
325. Id. 
326. Stites, supra note 139, at 154–62. 
327. Id. at 155–57. 
328. Id. at 158–60. 
329. AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, STATEMENT ON CONSENSUAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN 
FACULTY AND STUDENTS, Policy Reports and Documents 149 (June 1995), https://cpb-us-e1.wpmucdn. 
com/blogs.cornell.edu/dist/3/6798/files/2017/08/AAUP-Statement-on-Consensual-Relations-between-
Faculty-and-Students-2n3iia8.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Y29-KHJM]. 
330. In writing this section, I examined the policies of the top twenty universities, liberal arts 
colleges, law schools, and business schools according to the U.S. News and World Report Rankings and 
 











this category,331 as do Yale,332 University of Chicago,333 MIT,334 and 
Princeton.335 As a typical example, Princeton’s policy states: “Faculty 
members are prohibited from initiating or engaging in romantic or sexual 
behavior with undergraduate students at Princeton University. Faculty 
members are also prohibited from requesting or accepting sexual favors 
from undergraduate students at Princeton University.”336 The Princeton 
policy goes further in some ways than other policies prohibiting sexual 
relationships between professors and students by also prohibiting all sexual 
relationships in the context of a direct supervisory relationship, regardless 
of whether the supervisor is a professor and whether the student is an 
undergraduate or graduate student.337 
Other schools limit the ban to situations in which the professor has direct 
supervisory authority over the student. Columbia’s policy, for example, 
prohibits professors from engaging in sexual relationships with students 
over whom they exercise supervisory authority, but does not ban sexual 
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relationships altogether, even between professors and undergraduates.338  
Still other schools have developed so-called “discouragement policies.” 
Princeton, for example, adopts a species of discouragement policy with 
respect to any relationships between faculty and non-undergraduates 
involving a power disparity, noting: “Beyond [prohibited sexual 
relationships with undergraduates and direct supervisees], all romantic or 
sexual relationships between individuals of different University status 
require heightened awareness.”339 The policy goes on to emphasize 
concerns about power dynamics and favoritism, and concludes: 
Even when both parties have consented at the outset to a romantic or 
sexual relationship, the person in the position of greater authority, by 
virtue of his or her special responsibility and role in the core 
educational mission of the University, bears responsibility for any 
adverse professional consequences that arise.340 
By placing the responsibility for the relationship on the senior person, 
Princeton provides an additional disincentive to engage in a sexual 
relationship involving an institutional power disparity. 
IV. ACKNOWLEDGING THIRD PARTIES 
The previous Part surveyed the existing legal, regulatory, and 
institutional mechanisms that regulate sexual behavior involving an 
institutional power disparity. In this Part, I discuss three ways current 
mechanisms should be improved in order to better address third-party harms 
within institutions. First, Title VII law should recognize that both sexual 
favoritism and sexualization of a workplace environment, or some 
combination of the two, can sustain a hostile environment claim for third 
parties. Second, institutions should prohibit sexual relationships involving 
an institutional power disparity when those relationships are likely to harm 
third parties and the institution itself. Within workplaces, the prohibition 
should include relationships between supervisors and subordinates. Within 
institutions of higher education, it should include all relationships between 
professors and undergraduates. It should also include relationships between 
professors and graduate students within their department. Third, both 
workplaces and universities should require a brief and minimally intrusive 
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disclosure of any sexual relationship involving an institutional power 
disparity that does not fall into one of the previous categories. 
This Part is not meant to be comprehensive or to solve every question. 
Institutions vary to such a degree that there is unlikely to be any one-size-
fits-all solution. My aim, rather, is to sketch an overall approach that can be 
adapted to particular situations. In future work I will articulate a regulatory 
framework with more specificity.341 More generally, I hope to demonstrate 
concretely how the general principle of acknowledging third-party harm can 
and should inform law and policy. 
Finally, I wish to acknowledge an important concern, which I share, that 
attempts to regulate sexual behavior involving an institutional power 
disparity will result in disparate enforcement of laws and policies against 
non-white and LGBTQ people, among other disfavored outgroups.342 
Scholars have documented that such disparate enforcement is a problem in 
many areas of law, including antidiscrimination law. But the fact that a 
regulation might be disparately enforced is not a reason to do away with the 
regulation; it is a reason to work toward evenhanded enforcement.343  
Moreover, individuals who are non-white or LGBTQ are often more 
vulnerable to negative third-party consequences. As frequent institutional 
outsiders, such individuals may be more likely to lose out when others 
receive sexual favoritism; to suffer unique harms related to sexualization; 
and to find particularly alienating institutions where sexual relationships 
involving institutional power disparities are widespread and unchecked. 
Regulatory mechanisms designed to mitigate the harms of sexual behavior 
involving an institutional power disparity will help them too. 
A. Antidiscrimination Law 
Third parties should be able to recover for a violation of Title VII under 
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either a quid pro quo or hostile environment theory when they suffer harm 
as the result of being a third party to a relationship, regardless of whether 
that relationship is consensual. As Susan Best has stated: “If an employee is 
injured as a third-party by a sexual relationship, that employee’s right to a 
remedy should not rest on the consensual nature of said sexual 
relationship.”344 Informed by a fuller understanding of the harms that third 
parties suffer, courts should expand current avenues for recovery in two 
ways. 
First, courts should adopt a more realistic standard, informed by social 
science and concrete examples, for determining what counts as harm 
sufficient to sustain a Title VII hostile environment claim.345 Most of the 
cases in which courts have allowed recovery are quite extreme, generally 
involving multiple sexual relationships between supervisors and 
subordinates.346 The test should instead inquire whether the sexual 
relationship within the institution creates a hostile environment for a 
reasonable person, under all the circumstances, given the full catalog of 
third-party harms. Under such a test, a single sexual relationship between a 
supervisor and subordinate—regardless of whether that relationship was 
consensual—should permit recovery. 
Second, courts should permit recovery based even on a single incident 
of favoritism for a sexual partner. Here, plaintiffs have uniformly failed to 
recover, even when the harm was significant, such as a failure to receive a 
substantial promotion.347 As research has demonstrated, even a single 
instance of favoritism may cause a third party to believe that the only way 
to advance at work is to engage in a sexual relationship with a supervisor.348 
Harm from such favoritism thus extends beyond the refusal to receive a 
promotion. It includes consequences such as diminished workplace 
happiness and autonomy.349 It also includes very concrete consequences 
such as having to be supervised by an individual less qualified than 
oneself.350 Courts should therefore depart from cases premised upon 
decades-old EEOC guidance and expand opportunities for recovery based 
on a single instance of favoritism where such favoritism significantly affects 
the working environment. 
These twin aims can be accomplished without radical deviation from 
current Title VII law. As we gain a better empirical understanding of the 
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world, judges’ thinking and courts’ holdings generally shift in line with that 
understanding. The #MeToo movement, for all its messiness, has brought 
about a much fuller understanding of sexual assault, abuse, and harassment 
both within and beyond institutions. Courts can build upon that knowledge 
to accurately take account of third-party harms. 
B. Institutional Prohibition 
Workplaces and educational institutions should clearly prohibit sexual 
behavior involving an institutional power disparity when such behavior 
inherently harms third parties and the institution. In the workplace, such 
harm occurs when a relationship involves a supervisor and subordinate. In 
the higher education setting, such harm occurs when a relationship involves 
a professor and any undergraduate student, or a professor and any graduate 
student within the professor’s department.351 The harms that can arise in 
these scenarios are, as I have documented, serious and pervasive, and as a 
result justify total prohibition of sexual behavior involving such an 
institutional power disparity.352 
The costs to such regulation are not overwhelming. Some might protest 
that banning relationships between supervisors and subordinates, or 
professors and students, causes a specific harm—that is, preventing two 
people from forming a relationship who are perfect for each other. But even 
if we uncritically indulge, for a moment, the notion that there is such a thing 
as a single perfect match, then it would seem that the perfect match would 
be so precious that one or both of the parties involved should be willing to 
alter their status—or simply wait a little while—so as to avoid the conflict 
with their institutional environment. Perhaps one prospective partner can 
transfer to a different department. Perhaps a professor and a student can 
manage to keep their relationship purely professional for a few extra months 
until the student graduates. Perhaps the professor can even resign their post: 
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people have given up much more than a tenured professorship for true 
love.353 People cannot reasonably expect to make literally no personal 
sacrifices to remain in good standing with the institutions with which they 
voluntarily affiliate, and certain forms of restraint are justifiable when 
necessary to avoid harm to third parties and the institution itself. 
Others might protest that banning relationships between supervisors and 
subordinates, or professors and students, causes a more general harm—that 
is, it so limits the dating pools of people who spend much of their lives 
within their institutions that, if people are limited in who they can date 
within the institution, they may not be able to date at all.354 First, this protest 
overstates my actual proposal: people can still date within their workplace, 
for example, just not within their chain of command. Second, the claim that 
a prohibition on supervisor-subordinate dating amounts to a total 
prohibition on dating given the demands of the modern workplace is at best 
empirically questionable. With the number of dating websites and apps on 
the market, one might argue that it is easier to date—or find casual sex—
than ever before, and that the Internet has made it possible to connect with 
people far beyond one’s ordinary milieu, let alone one’s workplace.355 
Concerns that prohibitions on dating a subset of people within one’s 
institution amount to a prohibition on dating are unfounded. 
C. Institutional Disclosure 
When two members of an institution who are not prohibited from dating 
due to one of the circumstances described in Section IV.B. initiate a sexual 
relationship involving an institutional power disparity, institutions should 
require them to disclose that relationship to an appropriate entity within the 
institution. Although the relationship may not pose any actual or apparent 
conflicts at the time of disclosure, the relationships should be documented 
in order for the institution to take appropriate measures to avoid future 
conflicts that cause harm to third parties or to the institution itself. 
In order to protect the privacy interests of the parties involved, the 
disclosure should be minimally intrusive. Institutions differ too much to 
attempt to draft a universal policy, but a number of scholars and human 
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resources professionals have offered helpful guidance for institutions on 
drafting an appropriate policy.356 In general, such policies should require 
disclosure of no more than the minimum amount of information 
necessary—that is, that a sexual relationship exists, and its date of 
inception—to allow management of any conflicts that might arise. 
Institutions should also have discretion to mandate penalties for non-
disclosure; different situations within different institutions likely warrant 
different penalties. But a disclosure policy should have sufficient 
consequences that people will take it seriously: under some circumstances, 
termination is likely an appropriate consequence. 
Opponents may argue that even the disclosure is too onerous for a 
relationship involving consenting adults. But in many other instances, we 
require professionals to disclose conflicts of interest as part of their job. 
Academic grant applications require applicants to disclose conflicts ranging 
from financial conflicts to mentorship conflicts to personal relationships.357 
Pursuant to various ethical rules, law firms routinely run conflict checks 
before accepting clients.358 Federal statute requires that judges keep lists of 
affiliations that require them to recuse themselves from cases.359 These 
conflict disclosures are viewed as unremarkable. They are a necessary part 
of professionalizing the workplace. Disclosing sexual relationships might 
feel more personal in some instances, but it addresses a conflict that is no 
less serious. 
Some have criticized policies that intervene in supervisor-subordinate 
relationships on the ground that they have a disparate impact on women. 
That is, changing the employment relationship more frequently involves 
moving the subordinate than the supervisor, and this can derail women’s 
careers. This is a real concern that may be descriptively accurate in some 
workplaces—indeed, future research could profitably investigate this issue. 
But if such a disparity exists, the solution is not to tolerate behavior 
corrosive to workplace functioning, in many instances inhibiting the careers 
of other women in the process. Instead, the way to improve women’s career 
prospects is to improve overall workplace conditions for women. 
Institutions should attempt to manage conflicts in ways that do not result in 
harm to third parties or, in the aggregate, women employees. The goals are 
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complementary, not mutually exclusive—or, at least, they don’t have to be. 
CONCLUSION 
Sexual behavior involving an institutional power disparity has negative 
consequences both for third parties within the institution and for the 
institution itself. For years, such behavior has been tolerated when it is 
consensual, even though the consequences for third parties are often severe 
and long lasting. Moreover, institutional stakeholders often underestimate 
the harm of non-consensual sexual behavior due to insufficient attention 
paid to the harms that third parties suffer. This Article strives to make third 
parties part of the conversation. After all, some sexual behavior harms them 
too. 
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